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The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of
the Warrantless Surveillance Program
Kathleen Clark
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies mechanisms that help to hold the federal
government’s executive branch accountable for complying with the law,
and shows how claims of national security secrecy undermine the
effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms. It identifies four
distinct stages in the process of accountability, sets out a typology based
on the mechanisms’ location inside or outside of government, and
identifies some of the specific mechanisms that hold the executive branch
accountable for violations of the law. These multiple overlapping
mechanisms would appear to constitute a robust system of
accountability.
A review of how this system of accountability operated in connection
with the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program,
however, reveals that all of these mechanisms share a common
characteristic, which turns out to be a weakness: a dependence on the
provision of information. Remove the information, and the entire
structure of apparently robust accountability collapses. The executive
branch was able to prevent these multiple accountability mechanisms
from scrutinizing the warrantless surveillance program by asserting
national security secrecy. This systematic weakness in the accountability
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architecture has significant policy implications, including the need to
recognize a crime-fraud exception to the state secrets privilege.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Several Democratic members of Congress and human rights
organizations have called for establishing a “truth commission” to
investigate the Bush Administration’s interrogation and warrantless
surveillance policies.1 Others advocate criminal investigation and
even prosecution of Bush Administration officials who authorized
these policies.2 Republican legislators and some commentators
oppose any commission or criminal investigation of Bush
Administration policies, arguing that they would constitute an
attempt by those currently in power to criminalize their policy
differences with predecessors.3 President Obama also opposes a truth

1. See, e.g., Patrick Leahy, The Case for a Truth Commission, TIME, Mar. 2, 2009, at
25, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1880662,00.html;
JUAN E. MÉNDEZ ET AL., STATEMENT ON COMMISSION RELATING TO DETENTION,
TREATMENT, AND TRANSFER OF DETAINEES, http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/
file/317.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (endorsed by Amnesty International USA, Human
Rights First, and sixteen other organizations). While President Bush repeatedly asserted that
the harsh techniques he authorized did not amount to torture, see, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher,
Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons: ‘We Do Not Torture,’ President Says, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/11/07/AR2005110700637.html, at the end of the Bush Administration, a
Pentagon official publicly acknowledged that the treatment of at least one prisoner at
Guantanamo amounted to torture. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official:
Trial Overseer Cites ‘Abusive’ Methods Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1
(“‘We tortured [Mohammed al-]Qahtani,’ said Susan J. Crawford, in her first interview since
being named convening authority of military commissions by Defense Secretary Robert M.
Gates in February 2007.”).
2. See, e.g., Q&A: Jonathan Turley on Holding Bush and Cheney Accountable, posting
of Tony Mauro to The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/
2008/12/qa-jonathan-turley-on-holding-bush-and-cheney-accountable.html (Dec. 23, 2008,
13:39 EST).
3. Senator Kit Bond stated that a Truth Commission is “‘Third World country-type
stuff . . . where you go in and prosecute; if you lose an election you get prosecuted.’” Margaret
Talev & Marisa Taylor, Will Obama Back ‘Truth Commission’ to Probe Bush Practices?,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/vprint/story/62575.html. Stuart Taylor argues that criminal prosecutions would hinder any
search for truth because witnesses will plead the Fifth Amendment rather than provide
evidence. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Truth About Torture, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2008, at 36.
Kenneth Anderson argues that a “truth commission” would be “little more than political
payback.” Posting of Kenneth Anderson to New York Times Room for Debate Blog,
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commission, stating that he prefers to look forward rather than
backward.4
Is it necessary or appropriate to hold Bush Administration
officials accountable for their actions through a criminal or
commission investigation? This Article contributes to the debate on
this issue by placing it in a broader theoretical context and by
examining the degree to which accountability mechanisms operated
effectively during the Bush Administration. Commission and
criminal investigations are just two of the many mechanisms that can
hold the executive branch—and its officials—accountable for
violations of the law.
Part II of this Article explains, on the level of theory, what is
meant by legal accountability and it identifies four distinct stages of
accountability. On a more concrete level, Part III identifies some of
the most important mechanisms that hold the U.S. executive branch
accountable for violations of the law and sets out a typology of those
mechanisms.5 Part IV examines how those mechanisms operated in
connection with the Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance
of domestic communications. While the legal opinion function
eventually held the executive branch in check, most of the other
accountability mechanisms did not operate effectively in connection
with the warrantless surveillance program because of claims of
national security secrecy. Part V discusses the implications of this case
study for evaluating executive branch claims of national security
secrecy where those claims would undermine accountability.
II. MEANING OF “ACCOUNTABILITY”
This Article uses the term, “accountability,” to refer to the
process of accounting for one’s actions to someone else.6 To fully
describe the process of accountability, it is necessary to identify:
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/a-truth-commission-for-the-bushera/?pagemode=print (Mar. 2, 2009, 12:24 EST).
4. David Johnson & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at A1.
5. This Article does not address international mechanisms that attempt to hold the
executive branch accountable for illegal conduct, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross or the possibility of foreign prosecution of U.S. officials who commit war crimes.
6. Rob Jenkins, The Role of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability, in
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMBATING CORRUPTION 135, 136 (Anwar Shah ed.,
2007); see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999) (“[A]ccountability refers to the implicit
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the party giving the account or explaining its conduct
(the accountor),
 the party who receives the account (the accountrecipient7),
 the type of information provided,
 the processes used, and
 the possible consequences available.8
The focus of the accounting might be compliance with legal norms,
an employer’s norms, social norms, or moral norms.9 This Article
addresses legal accountability: whether the federal government’s
executive branch complies with the law and the mechanisms that
monitor such compliance.10 For the purposes of this Article, the
accountor may be the executive branch itself, a particular agency
within the executive branch, or an executive branch official. Some
accountability mechanisms—such as a civil lawsuit—can operate
directly against the executive branch or indirectly on the executive
branch through an officeholder. The account-recipient may be a
governmental body, such as an Inspector General, a congressional
committee, or a court; or may be an outside institution, such as the
press. The information generally includes facts regarding the
accountor’s actions, the surrounding circumstances, and arguments
about whether those actions were proper.
The process of accountability has four distinct stages. The first
stage is informing: the accountor provides information relating to its
conduct. Informing can occur through self-reporting, where the
accountor voluntarily provides this information, or through discovery,
where the account-recipient is in a position to require the accountor

or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to
others . . . .”).
7. Mark Bovens refers to the account-recipient as the account-forum. Mark Bovens,
Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 EUR. L.J. 447, 450–51
(2007). Other authors refer to it as account-holder.
8. Jerry Louis Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 115, 120 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006) (identifying the final component as
identifying possible sanctions); Bovens, supra note 7, at 451–52 (referring to “consequences”
rather than “sanctions.”).
9. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 8, at 119 (discussing legal, market-based and social
accountability regimes).
10. Cf. Bovens, supra note 7, at 456 (defining “legal accountability” as accountability
rendered through court proceedings).
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to provide the information.11 The second stage is justification, where
the accountor attempts to defend the legality of its conduct. The
third stage is evaluation, where the account-recipient evaluates the
accountor’s conduct. And the final stage is rectification, an accountrecipient’s response (such as a penalty or other remedy) when it is
dissatisfied with the proffered justification.12 Rectification may serve
any of several distinct purposes: incapacitation (preventing the
officeholder from engaging in similar activity by removing him from
office), deterrence (punishing the officeholder in order to deter him
or other officeholders from engaging in similar activity),
compensation (paying those harmed by the illegal conduct for the
harm they suffered), or symbolic expression (authoritatively stating
that what occurred was illegal).13
Some accountability mechanisms include multiple stages of
accountability. Civil lawsuits, for example, involve discovery,
justification, evaluation, and rectification. Other mechanisms, such as
the Freedom of Information Act and mandatory reporting statutes,
involve only a single stage, providing only partial accountability.14 A
single mechanism that provides only partial accountability may work
in concert with other mechanisms to effectuate all four stages of
accountability.
III. TYPOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Accountability mechanisms can build on each other, such as
when the leak of a controversial Justice Department memo and
investigative journalists’ news stories led to more intensive

11. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 8, at 118–19 (referring to self-reporting and discovery as
two distinct stages of accountability). Mark Bovens has adopted a narrower definition of
accountability, including only those mechanisms in which the accountor is obligated to
disclose information. Bovens, supra note 7, at 450.
12. Other writers have divided the accountability process differently. Rob Jenkins refers
to both discovery and justification as “answerability.” Jenkins, supra note 6, at 138–39.
Richard Mulgan includes justification in the self-reporting stage. Richard Mulgan, The Processes
of Public Accountability, 56 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 25, 27 (1997) (“reporting . . . may . . .
involve explanation and justification of actions that have been taken”).
13. Cf. Jon Elster, Accountability in Athenian Politics, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 253, 276 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (“I
have distinguished between two purposes of accountability: incapacitation and deterrence.”).
14. See Mulgan, supra note 12, at 26.
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congressional scrutiny of executive branch treatment of prisoners;15
or can interfere with each other, such as when an investigating
congressional committee grants use immunity to a witness invoking
the Fifth Amendment, and that immunity undermines the ability to
prosecute that witness.16 In evaluating the effectiveness of the various
accountability mechanisms, we need to be cognizant of the fact that
a mechanism may be effective even if it operates at only one of the
four stages of accountability. A Freedom of Information Act
disclosure will not by itself remedy illegal activity by the executive
branch. But such a disclosure may nonetheless be an integral part of
the entire accountability process if there are other mechanisms that
evaluate the government’s justification for its action and can seek a
remedy for any wrongdoing.17
To get a handle on the range of accountability mechanisms that
can hold the executive branch accountable for complying with the
law, this section sets out a typology of them, based on their location,
ranging from those that are:
(A) entirely internal to the executive branch (such as legal
opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel);
(B) entirely external to the executive branch (such as
investigations by congressional committees); and
(C) located (at least partially) within the executive branch, but
acting pursuant to a congressional mandate.
Thus, this Article distinguishes mechanisms that are purely internal
executive branch mechanisms from those that are located in the

15. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1013 (2008).
16. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversing John
Poindexter’s convictions because prosecution witnesses had reviewed his immunized testimony
before the congressional Iran-Contra Committee); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1990), modified on reh’g, 920 F. 2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating Oliver North’s
conviction on the same grounds); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1993) (noting that the Court of
Appeals decisions “‘makes a subsequent trial of any congressionally immunized witness
virtually impossible’” (quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d at 924 (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting))).
17. Mulgan, supra note 12, at 31, 35 (recommending a “multi-channelled approach to
public accountability,” and noting that “there is no reason to expect any one institution to
fulfil [sic] all the functions of accountability”).

363

DO NOT DELETE

4/12/2010 2:46 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2010

executive branch but have been created by Congress through
statutory enactments.18
A. Accountability Mechanisms that are Entirely
Internal to the Executive Branch
The prototypical accountability mechanism may well be the
congressional investigation of the executive branch, with that branch
having to explain and justify to someone outside of itself its
conduct.19 But certain accountability mechanisms are entirely
internal to the executive branch. This section describes two of those
mechanisms: legal opinions and internal investigations.
1. Legal opinions
One example of a purely executive branch accountability
mechanism is the practice of obtaining a legal opinion about
questionable conduct prior to engaging in that conduct. Under the
Constitution, the President can require a written opinion from the
head of each department,20 and by statute, Congress requires the
18. Others who have examined accountability mechanisms have missed this important
distinction. For example, in a 2006 essay, Neal Katyal indicated that he would outline “a set of
mechanisms that create checks and balances within the executive branch,” and he identified
four such mechanisms:
 overlapping jurisdiction among departments (e.g., State and Defense Department)
which may cause them to have competing conceptions of proper policy;
 requirements that the executive branch report particular information to Congress;
 civil service protection for most employees, insulating them from partisan political
control; and
 a dissent channel for State Department employees who disagree with current policy.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006). But the first three of these mechanisms have
their origin in Congress, not in the executive branch. Congress sets out in statute the
jurisdiction of each of the cabinet departments, so jurisdictional overlap is the result of
congressional action. Congress also created civil service protection and the reporting
requirements, which usually require that the information be delivered straight to Congress. So
while these three mechanisms are located in the executive branch, they are by no means purely
internal to the executive branch. Only the State Department’s dissent channel is purely internal
to the executive branch, established by Department regulations rather than by statute and with
reports staying within the Department. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANUAL 070 (1998). The dissent channel is limited to dissent on substantive foreign policy
issues, and is not for concerns about alleged violations of law. Id. at 071.2.
19. See MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-464.pdf.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Attorney General to provide legal advice to the President and other
department heads.21 By regulation, the Attorney General has
delegated this responsibility to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).22
The practice of obtaining legal advice can help ensure that an
actor stays within the limits of the law. If an agency wishes to engage
in particular action and requests a legal opinion from OLC, it may
learn that the proposed action would be illegal. Looking at this
situation through the lens of accountability, the agency involved is
the accountor and OLC is the account-recipient. This opinionwriting function partakes of several different stages of accountability:
self-reporting (when an agency provides OLC with information
about its proposed conduct), discovery (if the Justice Department
seeks additional information about the proposed conduct),
justification (if the agency provides an argument for the legality of its
proposed action), and evaluation (when OLC evaluates that
proposed justification and decides whether the proposed action is
legal).
While courts and commentators generally assume that allowing a
client to keep legal advice secret helps to ensure that clients comply
with the law,23 recent history shows that such secrecy can be
perverted to facilitate wrongdoing and undermine legal
accountability. In 2002, OLC issued a legal opinion concluding that
despite Congress’s enactment of a criminal law prohibiting torture,
executive branch officials could nonetheless legally torture prisoners
as long as the President authorized it.24 Both during its drafting and
after it was issued, this opinion was closely held within the executive
branch. By limiting internal circulation of the opinion, the Bush
Administration was able to delay the leaking of its improper conduct
and limit internal criticism.25 A 2009 Justice Department report
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–12 (2006).
22. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (2010).
23. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (asserting that the attorneyclient privilege “promote[s the] broader public interest[] in the observance of law”); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (“Courts frequently have asserted the argument that the
privilege furthers societal interests in law compliance . . . .”). But see Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers
and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (criticizing Upjohn’s analysis).
24. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Atty. General, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 23402340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
25. See infra Part III.C.2.b. (internal whistleblowing).
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noted that internal circulation and review of the opinion were
“deficient,” that the limitations on circulating the opinion “were, in
part, based on the limited number of security clearances granted to
review the materials,” and that “[t]his denial of clearances to
individuals who routinely handle highly classified materials has never
26
been explained satisfactorily.” Until the opinion was leaked, the
Bush Administration was able to rely on the opinion as the basis for
its policy of torturing prisoners allegedly connected to al Qaeda, and
effectively immunize government officials from later prosecution for
their actions.27 Eventually, the Washington Post obtained the
opinion and, on June 14, 2004, published it on its website.28 There
was an immediate public uproar because of the opinion’s dubious
legal justification of torture and extreme claims about executive
power.29 Nine days after the Washington Post published the opinion,
the Justice Department officially withdrew it,30 eventually replacing it
with a more narrowly drawn opinion.31 But until it was leaked, the
secrecy of the 2002 opinion enabled the Bush Administration to
subvert this accountability mechanism, transforming it from a
mechanism preventing illegality to one enabling it.32
2. Internal investigations
Another accountability-related practice involves conducting an
internal investigation to determine whether there has been
wrongdoing. Internal investigations generally partake of several

26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Report: Investigation into the
Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 259–60
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.
27. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 55–57 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006).
28. See David Ignatius, Small Comfort, WASH. POST, June 15, 2004, at A23.
29. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law: The Justice Department’s
Legal Contortions on Interrogation, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B03. For a more detailed
critique of the opinion, see Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture
Memorandum, 1 J.L. & NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y. 455 (2005).
30. Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed: Justice
Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A01.
31. Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, from Daniel Levin,
Acting Asst. Attorney General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Dec.
30, 2004).
32. See Sudha Setty, No More Secrets Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal
Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 593 (2009).
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stages of accountability: discovery (when an agency investigates
allegations of wrongdoing by interviewing witnesses and gathering
evidence), justification (when agency officials provide an argument
for the legality of their past action), and evaluation (when the
investigator analyzes the legality of the conduct, advises another
executive branch official about factual and legal conclusions, and
recommends a response).33 In many executive branch agencies,
Congress has created a specific office—the Inspector General—to
conduct such investigations of alleged wrongdoing.34 However, even
executive branch agencies that lack an Inspector General can conduct
their own internal investigations. For example, after the Clinton
Administration fired seven White House travel office employees,
there were allegations that the firings had been motivated by a desire
to outsource travel services to an Arkansas company with ties to the
Clintons. The White House responded by conducting an internal
investigation, resulting in an 80-page public report and reprimands
against four White House officials.35
An example of a national security-related internal investigation
was the CIA’s 1973 investigation of its own illegal conduct.
Prompted by press reports that the CIA had provided assistance to
Watergate burglars, CIA Director James Schlesinger sent a
memorandum to all CIA employees, directing them to report on all
CIA activities that “might be construed to be outside the legislative
charter of this Agency.”36 This investigation resulted in a nearly 700page report (known as the “Family Jewels”) detailing illegal
activities.37
33. Internal investigations occur in the private sector as well, and federal law has given
private sector organizations an incentive to engage in and set up an institutional structure for
such internal investigations in order to ferret out wrongdoing. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2009) (requiring organizations to establish effective
compliance and ethics programs); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
34. See discussion of Inspectors General, infra Part III.C.1.
35. Thomas L. Friedman, White House Rebukes 4 In Travel Office Shake-Up, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1993, at 11.
36. James R. Schlesinger, Memorandum for All CIA Employees (May 9, 1973),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/schlesinger_jewels.
pdf.
37. National Security Archive, The CIA’s Family Jewels, http://www.gwu.edu/~
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm. This report became known as the “Family
Jewels.” CIA Releases Two Collections of Historical Documents, June 26, 2007,
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007
/cia-releases-two-collections-of-historical-documents.html (indicating that this collection of
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An internal executive branch institution that has the potential to
serve as an accountability mechanism is the Justice Department’s
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). OPR was created in
1975 in response to the “ethical abuses and misconduct by
Department of Justice officials in the Watergate scandal,” and
investigates allegations relating to the professional ethics,
competence, and integrity of Justice Department attorneys.38 If OPR
finds misconduct, it recommends a range of punishments for the
attorney’s supervisor to impose and “ordinarily” informs state bar
disciplinary authorities of its finding.39 In the past, OPR disclosed
summaries of the cases where it found professional misconduct and
issued annual reports with statistical data. But under the Bush
Administration, OPR stopped providing such summaries, and its last
annual report was for the fiscal year ending in September of 2007.40
OPR investigations can entail long delays, and the head of OPR,
who is appointed by the Attorney General, lacks the independence
and stature of an arguably more effective account-holder, the Justice
Department’s Inspector General, who is appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness
of OPR because it usually keeps the results of its investigations
secret. Recently, however, OPR teamed up with the Justice
Department’s Inspector General (IG) to investigate politicized hiring
and firing at the Justice Department, producing four public
reports.41 The investigation found that Justice Department officials
documents is referred to as the “Family Jewels”). Another momentous national security-related
internal investigation, the multi-volume history of the Vietnam War (the “Pentagon Papers”),
focused not on illegality, as such, but on policy missteps. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE
PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 19–21 (1996) (discussing
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s motivations for commissioning the study).
38. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (July 25, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/poland
proc.htm [hereinafter OPR POLICIES & PROCEDURES]; Office of Professional Responsibility
Organizational Chart, http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/opr.htm#orgchart.
39. OPR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 38.
40. See Richard B. Schmitt, More Scrutiny, Secrecy at Justice, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2008,
at A14 (noting that in 2001, the Justice Department reversed its policy of publicly disclosing
summaries of cases where OPR found professional misconduct); OPR Annual Reports Home
Page, http://www.justice.gov/opr/reports.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-iaph-crd.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
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had violated federal law by improperly considering job candidates’
political and ideological affiliation when hiring for career positions.
They identified specific officials who had engaged in wrongdoing,
and recommended changing certain Department policies to make
recurrence less likely.42
This kind of purely internal executive branch investigation has a
significant advantage. Claims of national security secrecy will not
prevent the investigator from gathering the relevant information if a
high-level executive branch official commissions the investigation.43
A downside, however, is that the results may be closely held within
the executive branch. Most of the “Family Jewels” were kept secret
for more than three decades, and some of the information is still
secret.44 Also, if the person directing the internal investigation has a
vested interest in finding no illegality, the investigation may turn out
to be—or be perceived as—a “whitewash.”45
B.

Accountability Mechanisms that are Entirely
External to the Executive Branch

Some accountability mechanisms are entirely external to the
executive branch. These include some entirely extra-governmental
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008)
(hereinafter
POLITICIZED
HIRING
BY
MONICA
GOODLING),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-investigation-hire-slip.pdf.
42. See, e.g., POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING, supra note 41, at 135–39.
43. Cf. infra Part III.C (discussing a security clearance issue which stymied the Justice
Department Inspector General’s investigation of NSA’s domestic spying operation).
44. See David Corn, Where’s the CIA’s Missing Jewel?, THE NATION, CAPITAL GAMES
BLOG, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/capitalgames/208296 (June 26, 2007, 17:25
EST).
45. After the Justice Department’s disastrous 1993 raid on the Branch Davidian
compound in Waco, Texas, the Department conducted an internal investigation, EDWARD S.G.
DENNIS, JR., EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN STAND-OFF IN
WACO, TEXAS: FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL 19, 1993 (1993), but it was perceived by some to be a
whitewash of departmental wrongdoing. See The Waco Whitewash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993,
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/12/opinion/the-waco-whitewash.
html?pagewanted=1. Eventually, after revelations that the earlier investigation failed to uncover
all relevant information, the Department brought in an outsider to conduct another
investigation. See JOHN C. DANFORTH, INTERIM REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL CONCERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE MT. CARMEL COMPLEX WACO,
TEXAS, at ii (2000), available at http://www.cesnur.org/testi/DanforthRpt.pdf.
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bodies, such as the press and nongovernmental organizations, but
many are located in the legislative branch.46 This section discusses
some of those mechanisms.
Members of Congress have several tools to bring the executive
branch to account. For instance, Congress has the ability to gather
information about the executive branch, both informally—through,
for example, written requests to an executive branch official for
answers to particular questions—and formally through Committee
investigation with subpoenas for public testimony and the disclosure
of documents. Other Congress-based accountability mechanisms
include impeachment, investigation and reporting by the
Government Accountability Office, and statutory causes of action
against the executive branch or executive branch officials.47
1. Committee oversight
Congressional committee oversight has been a key accountability
mechanism since 1946, when Congress passed legislation directing
committees to engage in oversight activities.48 Committee oversight
46. In theory, elections could serve as a legal accountability mechanism for a first-term
president, or even for a second term president who wishes to see his party continue to control
the executive branch. See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT:
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 45 (2003) (“Elections set the outer limits of
acceptable government behavior . . . .”). But their primary focus is political accountability
rather than legal accountability. Id. at 41–44. In addition, “voters think of elections much
more as opportunities to try to select good types” rather than as a method of holding elected
officials accountable. James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians:
Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND REPRESENTATION 55, 82 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); see also Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2079
(2005) (“[I]ntermittent, highly contested elections are simply very poor devices for holding a
person accountable. Most electoral democracies present the voters with only two or three
realistic choices, which means that a multitude of issues must map into a small decision set.”).
47. Congressional oversight can be divided into direct oversight, which refers to the
review of executive branch activities by congressional appropriations and authorizing
committees, and indirect oversight, which refers to the many mechanisms by which Congress
enables other actors to review executive branch activities, including establishment of the
Government Accountability Office and Inspectors General, requirements that the executive
branch disclose information about its activities, and the authorization of private causes of
action against the executive branch. For a description of “fire-alarm oversight,” see Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
48. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA:
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 205, 207 (citing the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60
Stat. 832 (1946) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190(d) (1982))).
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can partake of all stages of accountability: informing (through
hearings, subpoenas, and informal information requests), justification
(when agency officials argue for the legality of past action),
evaluation (when the committee issues a report assessing whether the
executive branch has violated the law), and rectification (when
Congress enacts legislation in response). The primary function of
committee oversight processes is to gather information about
executive branch activities, which Congress can then use to
administer course corrections if necessary.
Committee oversight is often a powerful tool for gathering
information from the executive branch, but it comes with special
challenges. While Congress may use its contempt power and court
processes to obtain information from those outside the executive
branch, its ability to compel disclosure from the executive branch is
more circumscribed.49 Every year, the executive branch issues
thousands of reports to Congress as mandated by statute and
provides additional information in response to specific congressional
requests.50 But at times, the executive branch successfully resists
congressional attempts to obtain sensitive information, such as that
relating to intelligence or protected by a privilege. Where there is
conflict regarding congressional information requests, Congress and
the executive branch usually come to an accommodation.51
Sometimes Congress gets the information it seeks, but not always. In
addition, executive branch officials sometimes provide misleading
responses to congressional requests for information, which can
frustrate Congress’s oversight efforts, particularly if the deception
goes unpunished.52

49. See generally MORTON ROSENBERG & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONGRESS’S
CONTEMPT POWER: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf.
50. See CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORTS TO BE MADE TO
CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 110-4 (2007) (indicating that the Congress required the President
and cabinet agencies to issue 3,066 reports to Congress); Memorandum from Adam
Hilkemann, Research Assistant, Wash. U. in St. Louis Sch. of Law, to author, Re: Number of
Mandatory Reports to Congress from the Executive Branch (June 10, 2008) (on file with author)
(indicating that in 2007, Congress required the executive branch to provide over 3000 reports
to Congress).
51. See generally Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to
Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1992).
52. A related issue is whether executive branch officials are held accountable for
misleading Congress. Several criminal statutes prohibit misleading Congress, but only the
executive branch can bring criminal prosecutions against those who violate those statutes. In
the last sixty years, nineteen executive branch officials have been prosecuted for misleading
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Executive branch officials can justify their actions by testifying at
congressional hearings or writing letters to Congress, and Congress
can evaluate the proposed justification. If Congress concludes that
the executive branch has engaged in wrongdoing, it may be able to
“generate overwhelming political pressure” for the executive branch
to take corrective action,53 or it can require executive action by
enacting a statutory mandate. For example, in the wake of a
congressional investigation of the Bush Administration’s firing of
nine U.S. Attorneys, Congress enacted a new statute limiting the
President’s ability to replace U.S. Attorneys without consulting
Congress.54 At the extreme, if presidential wrongdoing is so serious
that it would constitute “high crimes or misdemeanors,” Congress
has the option of impeaching and removing the President.55
In general, congressional committee oversight may be more
robust or intensive when the political party that opposes the
President controls Congress.56 Recent history seems to be consistent
Congress. See infra APPENDIX. Most of those cases were brought by prosecutors who were not
under the political control of the President: Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski
prosecuted three of them and Independent Counsels prosecuted nine others. Id. A politically
independent prosecutor was available during only about a third of that time period. The Office
of Watergate Special Prosecutor existed from 1973 until 1976, and the Independent Counsel
statute was authorized for a five-year term on four occasions, for a total of 20 years. Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 591 (2006)); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–
409, 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1982); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100–191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103–270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994). The disproportionate share of prosecutions by
politically independent prosecutors suggests that the Justice Department is ordinarily
disinclined to prosecute executive branch officials for misleading Congress.
53. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 62; see also id. at 54–55 (“Legislative committees . . .
lack the final power of rectification, except indirectly through the force of publicity and
political pressure.”).
54. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY MAJORITY STAFF REPORT TO
CHAIRMAN JOHN CONYERS, JR., REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 13 (Jan. 13,
2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/IPres090113.pdf.
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
56. See generally David C.W. Parker & Matthew M. Dull, Divided We Quarrel: The
Politics of Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319 (2009) (explaining
that divided government is associated with an increase in the number of congressional
investigations). But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL,
LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at 31 (2005) (explaining that divided
government does not increase the number of high profile congressional investigations).
Brendan Nyhan has conducted a particularly rigorous analysis of this empirical question, and
noted that the Independent Counsel statute likely had a confounding effect on the question.
Brendan Nyhan, Does Divided Government Increase Presidential Scandal? (unpublished paper
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with that conclusion. The level of congressional oversight jumped
significantly when the opposition Democrats took control of
Congress after the 2006 mid-term elections.57
Ordinarily, both appropriations and authorizing committees
within the House and Senate review executive branch activities and
receive information about major initiatives through the budget
process. The proposed budget is available not just to all members of
Congress, but also to the public generally, and can be an important
source of information about the workings of the executive branch.
An important exception, however, is the budget for intelligence
operations. The intelligence budget is hidden within the Defense
Department budget, and only the House and Senate Intelligence
committees—not
the
appropriations
committees—receive
information about the intelligence budget.58 Only the members and
staff of the Intelligence Committees get to see the actual numbers
for the intelligence budget.
2. Government Accountability Office investigations
A key congressional institution, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) engages in two distinct activities that help to hold the
executive branch accountable for complying with the law.59 First, it
issues decisions in bid protests by government contractors claiming
that the executive branch violated the law in awarding a contract to a
competitor. Second, GAO conducts investigations of and issues
reports about executive branch programs at the request of

delivered at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file
with author).
57. Thomas E. Mann, Molly Reynolds, & Peter Hoey, Op-Chart: A New, Improved
Congress?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at WK, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/08/26/opinion/26mann.html (providing a chart showing approximately 50% increase
in oversight hearings during first six months of 110th Congress (controlled by opposition
Democratic party) in comparison with the first six months of 109th Congress (controlled by
the President’s Republican party)).
58. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities:
Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2008).
59. The GAO changed its name from General Accounting Office to Government
Accountability Office in 2004. See David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a
Name?, ROLL CALL, July 19, 2004, available at http://www.gao.gov/about/rollcall
07192004.pdf. While the President nominates the head of the GAO, the Comptroller General,
the Supreme Court considers the Comptroller General to be outside the executive branch
because he can be removed not just by impeachment but also through a congressional joint
resolution. See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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congressional committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking
members.60
Like internal executive branch investigations, GAO investigations
partake of the first three stages of accountability: informing,
justification, and evaluation. GAO cannot directly rectify any
wrongdoing it detects, but its reports can form part of a chain of
accountability, enabling Congress to put pressure on agencies for
rectification.61 By statute, if the Executive Branch decides not to
follow a GAO bid protest recommendation, it must promptly report
this decision to the Comptroller General, who then must inform the
relevant congressional committees and recommend further action.62
While most of GAO’s investigative reports focus on issues of
financial efficiency, some of them address the executive branch’s
compliance with the law.63 For example, one GAO report examined
whether agencies were complying with FOIA’s requirement that
agencies disclose in the federal register basic information about their
organization and operations. The report found twenty instances of
failure to make such disclosures, fourteen of which were being
remedied by the agencies themselves after discussions with GAO by
the time GAO published its report.64 Another example includes a
GAO report examining whether Curt Hebert, Jr., the Chairman of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), violated federal
statutes or regulations in his communications with Kenneth Lay, the
chairman of Enron, whose company was regulated by FERC.65 A
New York Times article had detailed a phone conversation between
Hebert and Lay in which Hebert requested Lay’s political support
and Lay asked that Hebert change his view on a FERC policy, raising
60. In the 2008 fiscal year, GAO produced over 1200 reports or written testimony,
mostly at the request of congressional committees or subcommittee chairs and ranking
members. See Homeland Security Digital Library, New GAO Performance & Accountability
Report for FY 2008, http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?=node/4489 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
61. See MULGAN, supra note 46, at 87.
62. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3554(b)(3), (e)(1) (2006).
63. Telephone Interview with James Lager, Deputy Ethics Counselor, GAO (Feb. 6,
2009).
64. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION:
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS (1986). This example
illustrates the discovery, evaluation, and rectification stages of accountability.
65. See Letter from Robert H. Hast, Managing Director, Office of Special
Investigations, to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, Committee on Governmental
Affairs (Aug. 16, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hast Letter], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011020r.pdf.
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the specter of possible solicitation to bribery.66 GAO interviewed
Hebert, Lay, and two FERC employees who overheard Hebert’s part
of the conversation, and concluded that there was no violation of
either criminal law or ethics regulations.67
By statute, the GAO has the ability to extract information from
the executive branch agencies, but that statute excepts from such
mandatory disclosure any records related to intelligence activities.68
Since the early 1960s, the CIA has effectively shut the GAO out
from conducting any oversight functions regarding its activities.69 In
fact, from the creation of the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees in the 1970s, the executive branch has argued that
those committees are the exclusive vehicles for congressional
oversight.70 More recently, the Director of National Intelligence has
taken a similar approach, arguing that oversight of intelligence
functions is beyond the purview of the GAO.71 In addition, the
Executive Branch has argued that while GAO has authority to
evaluate executive branch work that is done pursuant to statutes, it
lacks authority to evaluate executive branch work done pursuant to
the President’s constitutional authority, thus exempting wide swaths
of foreign policy and intelligence-related activities from GAO
scrutiny.72

66. Lowell Bergman & Jeff Gerth, Power Trader Tied to Bush Finds Washington All
Ears, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/05/25/politics/25POWE.html?pagewanted=1.
67. See Hast Letter, supra note 65.
68. 31 U.S.C. § 716(d)(1)(A) (2006).
69. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:
OBSERVATIONS ON GAO ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND CIA PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES
(2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/071801_hinton.pdf.
70. Id. at 3 (“The CIA has maintained that the Congress intended the intelligence
committees to be the exclusive means of oversight of the CIA, effectively precluding oversight
by [the GAO].”); see also Investigative Authority of the General Accounting Office, 12 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 171 (1988).
71. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SHARING: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR SHARING TERRORISMRELATED AND SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 29 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf. The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence refused to comment on GAO’s draft report, stating that “the review of intelligence
activities is beyond GAO’s purview.” Id.
72. See generally Investigative Authority of the General Accounting Office, 12 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 171 (1988).
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3. Intervention by a member of Congress on behalf of constituents
Members of Congress sometimes take action on behalf of
individual constituents who have been aggrieved by executive branch
agencies. This is accountability at the retail level rather than at the
wholesale level. The concern is not whether an entire policy is legal,
but whether the executive branch’s treatment of one particular
constituent is legal. In some ways similar to a civil lawsuit, this type
of activity partakes of all four stages of accountability. The member
(or her staffer) may initially seek more information from the agency
(roughly analogous to the discovery process), and may eventually
address legal arguments to the agency on behalf of the constituent
(roughly analogous to legal argument addressed to a judge). Unlike
litigation, however, the persuasiveness of the argument may be
enhanced by the stature of the member of Congress and the degree
to which the agency is beholden to that member. Thus, intervention
on behalf of a constituent may not only reflect an effort to rectify a
legal wrong by the executive branch, but may instead reflect a
political effort to convince an executive branch official to reverse a
decision that disfavored the constituent.
C.

Accountability Mechanisms Located in Executive
Branch but Based on Congressional Action

This section examines accountability mechanisms that are located
in the executive branch, but that were created by congressional
action. It divides these statutorily-created mechanisms into two
categories: those that involve only executive branch actors, and those
that also involve actors outside the executive branch. Accountability
mechanisms within the executive branch include Inspectors General
(IGs) who conduct regular audits and investigate alleged
wrongdoing in 60 executive branch agencies, and Ombudspersons,
who mediate disputes.73 Mechanisms that involve nonexecutive
actors include the Freedom of Information Act, protections for
whistleblowers, and specially created investigative commissions.

73. Some federal ombudspersons have been created by the executive branch itself
through regulation rather than by Congress through statute.

376

DO NOT DELETE

357

4/12/2010 2:46 PM

The Architecture of Accountability

1. Congressionally created mechanisms within the executive branch
a. Inspectors General. Over the objection of the executive
branch,74 Congress created Inspectors General and gave them the
authority to receive confidential tips about waste, fraud, and abuse,
and to directly access all of an agency’s records to investigate those
tips and other allegations.75 Every six months IGs issue detailed
reports to the agency head and Congress.76 When IGs discover
“particularly serious or flagrant problems” within the agency, they
must report immediately to the agency head, who must forward that
report to Congress.77 IG reports have become a particularly
important source of information for congressional committees
investigating the executive branch.78 IGs can recommend sanctions
against particular employees and changes in administrative processes,
but cannot impose either.79 So IG investigations partake in the
discovery, justification, and evaluation stages of accountability, but
not rectification. On the other hand, the publicity that accompanies
issuance of an IG report can result in rectification through legislative
change.80 For example, after concerns were raised about the FBI’s
extensive use of National Security Letters (NSLs) to collect
information, Congress required the Justice Department IG to audit

74. FREDERICK M. KAISER, STATUTORY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: PAST AND
PRESENT, at CRS-4 (2007), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/
10207/19765/98-379_20070621.pdf?sequence=2; PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING
GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 62–63
(1993) (“[A]ll twelve departments covered by the [Inspector General Act of 1978] testified in
opposition [to it].”). In addition to ferreting out waste, fraud, and abuse, Inspectors General
also make recommendations on how agencies can increase their efficiency and effectiveness. Id.
75. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2006)). But see 50 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 8D, 8E (permitting
Treasury Secretary and Attorney General to restrict IGs’ access to information relating to
ongoing investigations, confidential sources, and other matters).
76. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5.
77. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(d).
78. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 56 (quoting “a key legislative player” as stating that “IGs
gave us . . . someone who would give us regular input through the semi-annual reports and
irregular access [to information] through the development of good working relationships”).
79. For example, during the Reagan Administration, the IG at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) discovered serious problems with the operation of a
program related to Section 8 housing and recommended suspending that program. HUD
Secretary Samuel Pierce refused to suspend the program, which spawned a massive scandal and
Independent Counsel investigation of criminal wrongdoing. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 69.
80. In addition, something akin to rectification occurs when the agency adopts the IG’s
recommendations.
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the FBI’s use of NSLs.81 Those audits revealed widespread problems
in the FBI’s administration of NSLs82 and helped spur legislation
cutting back the FBI’s authority to issue them.83
There are two different classes of statutorily created IGs—those
who require presidential nomination with Senate confirmation and
those who are appointed by heads of departments. The President
nominates and the Senate confirms IGs in all fifteen cabinet
departments and in fourteen other federal agencies.84 In thirty-one
smaller agencies and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, IGs are appointed by department heads.85 The
Inspector General Act directs the President and department heads to
select IGs on the basis of their expertise and without regard to
political affiliation.86 They generally have independence in how they
conduct their work,87 but on occasion, Congress has responded to
specific allegations of wrongdoing by requiring IGs to investigate

81. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109177, § 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006).
82. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS (2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S
USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
special/s0803b/final.pdf.
83. After the first Inspector General report, Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced a
bill to place limits on the use of National Security Letters on July 26, 2007, H.R. 3189, 110th
Cong. (2007), and Senator Russ Feingold introduced a companion bill in the Senate on Sept.
25, 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007).
84. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2006) (creating two Inspectors General within the Treasury
Department); 5 U.S.C. app. 3. § 3(a) (Presidential appointment process); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 11
(identifying the twenty-nine agencies with presidentially appointed IGs).
85. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G (identifying thirty agencies with department head-appointed
IGs); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8K (authorizing Director of National Intelligence to create an office of
Inspector General); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G note (Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction) (indicating in subsection (c) that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, appoints the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction).
86. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a).
87. The heads of seven departments (Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury,
CIA, the Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Postal Service) can prevent their Inspector General
from pursuing an investigation in order to protect an ongoing criminal investigation or
national security, but must report to the congressional committees. FREDERICK M. KAISER &
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, at CRS-94 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf.
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and report on the allegations.88 The President or department head
who appointed the IG can also remove an IG without cause, but
must inform Congress of the reasons for removal.89
In 1988, when Congress created an Inspector General for the
Justice Department, the Department successfully resisted
congressional efforts to fold the Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) into the Justice IG.90 Although members of Congress and the
Justice Department IG himself have proposed placing OPR within
the Office of Inspector General in order to give it more
independence, the Executive Branch has repeatedly resisted these
proposals.91
Folding OPR into the Justice IG could go a long way toward
improving accountability by ensuring that OPR is responsive to the
legislative branch and making OPR processes more transparent.
Currently, the head of OPR is appointed by the Attorney General
and is subject to the Attorney General’s incentive awards. The Justice
Department’s IG, on the other hand, is nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. Furthermore, while the head of OPR
reports to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, the
IG reports both to Congress and the Attorney General. Finally,
while OPR generally keeps its investigative reports secret, the IG
regularly issues public reports on its investigations. 92 The Justice
88. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, § 119, 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006).
89. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 3(b), 8G(e). President Reagan’s second act as President was his
decision to remove all of the Inspectors General who had been appointed by President Carter.
LIGHT, supra note 74, at 102.
90. LIGHT, supra note 74, at 129–30.
91. In 2007, for example, Representative John Conyers proposed an amendment to the
Improving Government Accountability Act, H.R. 928, 110th Cong. (2007), which would
have removed the requirement that the Department of Justice (DOJ) IG refer to OPR any
investigations of DOJ lawyers. See Summary and Text of Amendments Submitted to the Rules
Committee for H.R. 928, http://www.rules.house.gov/announcement_details.aspx?News
ID=3052; Amendment 4 to H.R. 928, as Reported: Offered by Mr. Conyers of Michigan,
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/amendments/hr928/110_hr928_conyers4.
pdf. While the House of Representative adopted Conyers’ amendment, it was later dropped in
Conference. See Bruce Moyer, Congress Declines to Give DOJ Watchdog More Teeth, FED.
LAWYER, Oct. 2008, at 10; see also Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors
General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th
Congress (July 11, 2007) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/testimony/ 0707/index.htm.
92. OPR does issue annual reports summarizing the kinds of cases it has investigated,
but these reports provide few details about specific allegations and outcomes, and there are
long delays in even this information being disclosed. As of January 2010, for example, the
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Department’s IG, with its congressional mandate and independence
from the Department leadership, has produced a more robust
accountability regime than OPR. This contrast in the records of the
Justice Department’s IG and OPR reveals the limits that may be
inherent in a purely internal executive branch accountability
mechanism.
Inspectors General have sometimes succeeded in achieving
accountability where other mechanisms have failed. For example, in
the wake of the Justice Department’s arrest of more than 1200 aliens
after September 11th, there was concern that these prisoners were
languishing and being abused in jail, unable to contact family or
lawyers.93 Despite requests by members of Congress and newspaper
editorials, the government refused to reveal the names of these
prisoners, the reasons they were being detained, or their location.94
Several public interest organizations filed a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) lawsuit in an attempt to force the government to reveal
the identities of these prisoners, the dates of their arrests, and the
nature of the charges against them, but the government convinced
the D.C. Circuit that release of this information could help a
terrorist group impede the government’s investigation of the
September 11th attacks and thus was exempt from disclosure under
FOIA.95 Nonetheless, the Justice Department’s Inspector General
initiated an investigation into the detention and treatment of these
prisoners, and ultimately issued a report criticizing several aspects of
this mass detention.96 That report described just how broadly the
September 11th investigative dragnet fell, and indicated that
immigrants with no connection to terrorism were nonetheless
most recent OPR Annual Report available was for fiscal year 2007 (a period ending on Sept.
30, 2007). See OPR Annual Reports, http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/reports.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2010).
93. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEPT. 11 DETAINEES 1–2
(2003) [hereinafter DOJ IG, SEPT. 11 DETAINEES].
94. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C.
2002) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
95. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 931 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (FOIA exception 7 for law enforcement documents applies to the information
requested).
96. While the DOJ IG report provided aggregate totals of the number of immigration
detainees and their locations, it was not coextensive with the concerns expressed by the public
interest groups, and in particular did not examine the treatment of prisoners who were held
pursuant to material witness warrants rather than immigration violations. DOJ IG, SEPT. 11
DETAINEES, supra note 93, at 4.
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classified as “of interest to the September 11 investigation.”97 While
the report did not provide all the information that the public interest
organizations had requested in the FOIA suit, it did provide
aggregate information on the number of prisoners, their countries of
origin, and their dates of arrest.98
b. Ombudspersons. A second type of internal executive branch
mechanism created by Congress is the ombudsperson, an official
who receives and investigates complaints by individuals, businesses or
others who have been aggrieved by an agency.99 Ideally, an
ombudsperson is both independent (in that she is not subject to the
control of the agency officials that she investigates) and is impartial
(in that she does not have conflicts of interest).100 Ombudspersons
partake of the first three stages of accountability: informing,
justification, and evaluation. They have the authority to investigate
and recommend action, and sometimes serve as a mediator between
the agency and the complaining party. While ombudspersons can

97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 21–22. The report indicated that 491 were arrested in New York and seventy
were arrested in New Jersey, but redacted the names of the eleven other states where
individuals were arrested. Id. at 22; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow
“War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1148–63 (2007).
99. The complaining party may be external, such as a small business complaining about
agency regulations, or internal, such as an agency employee complaining about her treatment
within the workplace. The Small Business Administration’s Office of the National Ombudsman
“receives [complaints] from small business[es] . . . and acts as a liaison between them and
federal agencies.” About the Office of the National Ombudsman, http://www.sba.gov/
aboutsba/sbaprograms/ombudsman/aboutus/OMBUD_ABOUTUS.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2010). It was created by Congress and has the power “to receive, substantiate, and report
to Congress complaints and comments from small business owners regarding regulatory
enforcement actions taken against small businesses by federal agencies.” See U.S. Small
Business Administration, Nicholas Owens, National Ombudsman, SBA Office of the National
Ombudsman,
http://www.sba.gov/tools/monthlywebchat/2007/CHAT_OWENS_BIO.
html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMAN CAPITAL: THE
ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2001) [hereinafter HUMAN CAPITAL]
(identifying ten agencies that had ombudspersons addressing employee complaints).
100. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 2 (2004), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/
webupload/commupload/AL322500/newsletterpubs/115.pdf (identifying independence,
impartiality and confidentiality as “essential characteristics of [all] ombuds”). The ABA
indicates that an ombudsperson is “independent” if no one who is “subject to the ombuds’s
jurisdiction or anyone directly responsible for a person under the ombuds’s jurisdiction (a) can
control or limit the ombuds’s performance of assigned duties or (b) can, for retaliatory
purposes, (1) eliminate the office, (2) remove the ombuds, or (3) reduce the budget or
resources of the office.” Id. at 3.
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recommend to the agency or to Congress specific reforms,101 they
lack the power to impose their view or require the agency to
respond.102
In the federal government, members of Congress have long
served an ombuds-like role when they provide constituent service.103
In recent decades, Congress and the executive branch have created
specific ombudsperson positions to take on this task in dozens of
agencies.104 Some of these officials are called “ombudspersons,” but
others serve this ombuds function while having a different title, such
as the National Taxpayer Advocate,105 Office of Special Counsel, and
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS).106
Ombudspersons have two distinct functions relevant to executive
branch accountability: assisting individuals or businesses that have
been harmed by illegal government action and providing Congress
with information about problems within the executive branch. The
executive branch sometimes chafes at the efforts of ombudspersons
and attempts to limit their independence or close them down. For
example, in 2007, Congress passed legislation to establish the Office
of Government Information Services (OGIS), which would serve as
an ombudsperson to those making FOIA requests.107 Congress
placed this office within the National Archives and mandated that it
would “offer mediation services to resolve disputes between” FOIA

101. See, e.g., HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 99, at 8 (“An ombudsman . . . brings to an
entity’s attention chronic or systemic problems and makes recommendations for
improvement.”).
102. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 91 (2003).
103. Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996) (“[C]ongressional casework covers much of the same
terrain as might be handled through an ‘ombudsman’ system in other nations.”).
104. The website of the Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen lists thirty-four executive
branch agencies (or subparts) with ombudspersons. See Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen,
http://ombudsman.ed.gov/federalombuds/membership.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
105. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created the Office of Taxpayer Ombudsman in
1979, and Congress codified the position in 1988, eventually changing its name to National
Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) and expanding its authority to protect the interests of taxpayers and
to report to Congress. See Evolution of the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/evolution_of_the_office_of_the_taxpayer_advocate.pdf (last visited Jan.
14, 2010). Unlike most ombudspersons, the NTA can issue orders requiring its agency (the
IRS) to take certain actions in the interests of taxpayers. Id.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(1) (2009).
107. See generally Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
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requesters and agencies as an alternative to litigation.108 While
President Bush signed the bill that established this office, five weeks
later he proposed abolishing the office and transferring its functions
to the Department of Justice.109 Open government advocates decried
this move, arguing that placing OGIS in the Department of Justice
would destroy its independence because it would place the office
within the department tasked with defending agencies sued by FOIA
requesters.110
Agency officials have sometimes resisted the efforts of
ombudspersons, and in one case an agency eventually dissolved the
ombuds office. Congress created the EPA’s National Ombudsman in
1984 to deal with public complaints related to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), but when statutory
authority expired in 1989, EPA retained the office, and expanded its
mandate to deal also with Superfund and other EPA programs.111 In
January of 2001, the EPA issued new guidance for the National
Ombudsman, clarifying that he could not play a role on issues that
were the subject of litigation.112 The incumbent Ombudsman
protested this limitation, as did several members of Congress.113
Despite these protests, the EPA effectively diminished the office’s
independence, transferring the incumbent Ombudsman to the Office
of the Inspector General, an office that had allegedly interfered with
earlier Ombudsman investigations.

108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(1), (3) (2010).
109. Letter from Access Reports, Inc. et al. to Senators Robert C. Byrd & Thad Cochran
(Feb. 6, 2008), in 154 CONG. REC. S1051 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2008).
110. See, e.g., Structure and Function of the Office of Government Information Services
Established by the “Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007”
(P.L. 110-175): Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census, & Nat’l Archives,
110th Cong. (2008) (Testimony of Thomas Blanton, Executive Director, National Security
Archive, George Washington Univ.), available at http://informationpolicy.oversight.
house.gov/documents/20080919140008.pdf.
111. Draft Guidance for National Hazardous Waste Ombudsman and Regional
Superfund Ombudsmen Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 365, 366 (Jan. 3, 2001).
112. See id. at 365–68.
113. See Office of the Ombudsman at the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. On Environmental & Public Works, 107th Cong. 65–72 (June 25, 2002)
(statement of Robert J. Martin, Former EPA National Ombudsman), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=
f:83699.pdf.
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2. Congressionally created mechanisms within the executive branch that
involve outside actors
This section describes accountability mechanisms that are located
within the Executive but also involve nonexecutive actors. These
include information requests under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), protection of whistleblowing by executive branch
employees, and specially created investigative commissions.
a. Freedom of Information Act. The Freedom of Information Act
and its 1974 Amendments were a radical departure that set the stage
for a new era of increased transparency in government. Under the
Act, individuals and organizations can request government
information for any reason.114 Requestors are not limited to seeking
information about government wrongdoing, and most FOIA
requests are entirely unrelated to allegations of government
misconduct. Nonetheless, FOIA requests have been instrumental in
revealing numerous government scandals,115 and the statute has
enabled countless people and organizations to partake of the
discovery stage of accountability.
The process of seeking information can be cumbersome and may
entail long delays. Where the request is initially denied, the requestor
can administratively appeal116 and even file a lawsuit if the
administrative appeal is unsuccessful. Some nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) such as the National Security Archive, Judicial
Watch, and Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
117
have utilized FOIA extensively.
Unlike individuals, these
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); see also Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO
Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Gov’t
Efficiency, Financial Mgmt. & Intergovernmental Relations, and H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.,
Veterans Affairs, and Int’l Relations, H. Comm. on Governmental Reform, 107th Cong. (July
18, 2001) (statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/071801_hinton.html
(“Almost 90 percent of our staff days are in direct support of Congressional requestors,
generally on the behalf of committee chairmen or ranking members.”). In 2002, Congress
limited the ability of foreign governments to seek information under the statute. Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, sec. 312, § 552(a)(3), 116 Stat.
2383, 2390–91 (2002).
115. See Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–59.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006).
117. See, e.g., About the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsar
chiv/nsa/the_archive.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“The Archive obtains its materials
through a variety of methods, including the Freedom of Information act . . . . Archive staff
members systematically track U.S. government agencies and federal records repositories for

384

DO NOT DELETE

357

4/12/2010 2:46 PM

The Architecture of Accountability

organizations can take the long view in their investigations of
government wrongdoing, sometimes receiving documents more than
118
a decade after they initially requested them. These NGOs’ FOIA
work can lead to further government investigations and legislative
change. For example, a FOIA lawsuit brought by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center resulted in the disclosure of abuses of
Patriot Act authority, which then led to an investigation by the
119
Justice Department’s Inspector General.
In the FOIA, Congress granted a general right to access
government information, but it also limited that right by including
120
in the statute broad exemptions.
Two of those exemptions are
particularly relevant to national security information: the (b)(1)
exemption for information that is classified pursuant to executive
order, and the (b)(3) exemption for information that is protected
121
pursuant to statute. Several statutes instruct the executive branch
to protect national security-related information, including the
statutory protection for intelligence sources and methods,
122
encryption, and atomic weapons information.
b. Whistleblower protection. Whistleblowers serve as an
accountability mechanism when they call attention to illegal
executive branch actions. From Pentagon employee Ernest
Fitzgerald’s 1969 testimony to Congress about billion dollar cost
overruns,123 and chemist Frederic Whitehurst’s letters to the Justice
documents that either have never been released before, or that help to shed light on the
decision-making process of the U.S. government and provide the historical context underlying
those decisions.”); Judicial Watch: About Us, http://www.judicialwatch.org/about-us (last
visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“The motto of Judicial Watch is ‘Because no one is above the law.’ To
this end, Judicial Watch uses the open records or freedom of information laws and other tools
to investigate and uncover misconduct by government officials and litigation to hold to
account politicians and public officials who engage in corrupt activities.”); About CREW,
http://www.citizensforethics.org/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“CREW employs the law
as a tool to force officials to act ethically and lawfully and to bring unethical conduct to the
public’s attention through: . . . Freedom of Information Act Requests . . . .”).
118. National Security Archive, 40 Years of FOIA, 20 Years of Delay: Oldest Pending
FOIA Requests Date Back to the 1980s (2007), available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB224/ten_oldest_report.pdf.
119. Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–57.
120. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1), (3).
122. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i) (intelligence sources and methods); 18 U.S.C. § 798
(cryptographic information); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y), 2162 (atomic weapons).
123. Myron Glazer, Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared, 13 HASTINGS CENT. REP.
33, 39 (1983).
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Department’s Inspector General about junk science in the FBI crime
lab during the 1990s,124 to Coleen Rowley’s memorandum to FBI
Director Robert Mueller in 2002 about the investigation of Zacarias
Moussaoui,125 whistleblowers’ willingness to come forward with
information has been instrumental in triggering other accountability
mechanisms. Whistleblowing involves two stages of accountability,
but reverses their usual order. A whistleblower engages in evaluation
when she determines that the government conduct is improper and
in informing when she discloses the alleged misconduct. Executive
branch whistleblowers may report illegal activity internally to an
executive branch official or externally to Congress or the press.
Congress has provided some protection for executive branch
whistleblowers, but has excluded significant portions of the federal
bureaucracy—those who engage in intelligence work—from its
protection.
Congress has recognized the importance of whistleblowers by
enacting a series of legal protections for them. In 1912, Congress
declared that the right of executive branch civil service employees to
furnish information to Congress “shall not be denied or interfered
with.”126 But this declared right did not provide any concrete
protection for employees who reported wrongdoing to Congress. In
1978, Congress provided a cause of action for certain executive
branch employees who experienced retaliation for disclosing
information about waste, fraud, and abuse.127 The 1978 legislation
created a new executive branch agency, the Office of Special
Counsel, which was tasked with the role of protecting
whistleblowers.128
124. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FBI LABORATORY: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVESRELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
special/9704a/.
125. Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, The Special Agent, TIME, Dec. 30, 1992, at 34.
126. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912).
127. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, sec. 703(a)(2), 92 Stat.
1111, 1216–17 (1979). Congress strengthened those protections in the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, sec. 2(b), 103 Stat. 16 (1989). For a discussion
of federal whistleblower protection, see LOUIS FISHER, NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS (2005); Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989:
Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 533–36
(1999).
128. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-454, sec. 202, §§ 1204, 1206, 92
Stat. 1111, 1112 (1979).
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While Congress has made several efforts to encourage
accountability
through
whistleblower
protection,
robust
whistleblower protection has proven difficult to achieve. The first
head of the Office of Special Counsel, a presidential nominee,
actually worked to subvert the agency’s purpose, and trained
governmental managers on how they could fire whistleblowers with
impunity.129 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the only court
that hears whistleblower lawsuits, has repeatedly interpreted the
whistleblower protection statute narrowly, excluding many
whistleblowers from its protection.130 Employees who blow the
whistle on illegal government action continue to suffer retaliation,
including the loss of their jobs, security clearances and careers.131
Even apart from these weaknesses in implementation of
whistleblower protection, the statutes themselves exclude from their
coverage executive branch employees who do intelligence-related
work.132 In addition, the statutes explicitly exclude from protection
the public disclosure of classified information.133
c. Special Commissions. In addition to FOIA and legislation
prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers, Congress has
occasionally acted to heighten executive accountability by
establishing ad hoc investigative commissions that include members
chosen by the House or the Senate as well as by the President. These
commissions can partake of all four stages of accountability:
informing (when the commission gathers information), justification
(when executive branch officials attempt to defend their conduct),
evaluation (when the commission decides whether that conduct was
proper), and—to a limited degree—rectification (if the commission
states authoritatively that the government’s conduct was improper).
Recognizing that Congress and the executive branch sometimes

129. Devine, supra note 127, at 544.
130. See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2007, H.R. REP. NO. 110-42, pt. 1, at 4 (“This bill [the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007] also responds to decisions by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the MSPB limiting the scope of disclosures
covered under the federal whistleblower protection statute.”).
131. See James Sandler, The War on Whistleblowers, SALON, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/11/01/whistleblowers/.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (excluding from protection the disclosure of information
“specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
the conduct of foreign affairs”).

387

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/12/2010 2:46 PM

2010

disagree about whether particular information should be classified, in
2004 Congress passed legislation giving an advisory group, the
Public Interest Declassification Board, responsibility to review the
disputed material and make a recommendation to the President on
whether particular information identified by a congressional
committee should be classified.134 The Board consists of nine
members, five appointed by the President and four chosen by
congressional leaders.135
At times, these specially appointed committees conduct
investigations of past government conduct, and these investigations
“are often the key factor in provoking the executive into itself
undertaking rectification.”136 One example of this phenomenon is
the Commission on the Japanese Internment, which, forty years after
the fact, investigated the executive branch’s internment of over
100,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. The internment
was essentially approved by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v.
United States,137 but it is now seen as unnecessary, unjust, and based
on the prejudices of certain military officials rather than on military
necessity. President Ford officially withdrew the Executive Order
that had established the internment policy;138 Congress passed
legislation authorizing reparations, based in part on the work of the
Commission;139 and courts overturned criminal convictions against
three Japanese Americans who violated the internment orders.140
When a purely internal executive branch investigation is deemed
inadequate, Presidents may establish an ad hoc commission to
134. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, § 1102, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2006)
(Declassification of Information)). Congress had authorized the creation of the Public Interest
Declassification Board in 2000, but its responsibilities were limited to making general policy
recommendations on declassification efforts rather than reviewing specific disputed documents.
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, Title VII, 114
Stat. 2831, 2856–64 (2000).
135. 50 U.S.C. § 435 note (2006) (Declassification of Information, sec. 703(c)).
136. MULGAN, supra note 46, at 47.
137. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
138. Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 35,7741 (Feb. 19, 1976).
139. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. 1989).
140. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir.
1985). For a discussion of these cases, see ERIC YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL
IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK WU, RACE, RIGHTS & REPARATION: LAW & THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001).
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investigate alleged wrongdoing. Presidents can create commissions
unilaterally, as President Reagan did when he established the Rogers
Commission to investigate the Challenger space shuttle disaster in
1986141 and President Johnson did when he established the Warren
Commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy.142
On occasion (and sometimes over the objection of the President)
Congress has established investigative commissions through statute,
including the 9/11 Commission.143 Such commissions may or may
not have subpoena power, and may be of short duration or limited
staff. Their purpose tends to be both retrospective and prospective:
finding facts about past wrongdoing and making recommendations
about future government action.144
IV. A CASE STUDY IN ACCOUNTABILITY: THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY’S WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
One might expect that the multiplicity of the accountability
mechanisms described above would hold the executive branch in
check. But the executive branch has at times used claims of national
security secrecy to avoid or defeat their effectiveness. This section
examines the role these accountability mechanisms played in
connection with the NSA’s warrantless domestic surveillance
program, and the degree to which the Bush Administration’s claims
of national security secrecy undermined those mechanisms.

141. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT (1986), available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/
genindex.htm.
142. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY (1964), available at http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commissionreport/index.html.
143. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (known as
the 9/11 Commission) was created by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Pub. L. No. 107-306, §§ 601–611, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002); NAT’L COMM’N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004); see Mark
Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1239 (2008).
144. See KENNETH KITTS, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS & NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
POLITICS OF DAMAGE CONTROL (2006); Lance Cole, Special National Investigative
Commissions: Essential Powers and Procedures (Some Lessons from the Pearl Harbor, Warren
Commission, and 9/11 Commission Investigations), 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009).
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A. The NSA’s Warrantless Surveillance Program
During the 1970s, Congress undertook extensive investigations
of U.S. intelligence activities, spurred in part by Watergate, and
discovered that intelligence agencies had engaged in warrantless
surveillance of U.S. citizens based on their political beliefs and
activities.145 In response, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act in 1978, and in doing so it clarified that within the
United States, electronic surveillance is legal only if it is authorized
by statute. There are two statutory regimes that specifically authorize
and regulate electronic surveillance: Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1968,146 which authorizes a warrant where there is
probable cause to believe that the communication would reveal
evidence of a crime; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA),147 which authorizes a warrant where there is probable cause
to believe that one of the parties is the agent of a foreign power or
an international terrorist organization. To enforce this new regime,
Congress included in FISA a criminal prohibition on any electronic
surveillance not authorized by statute so that government officials
who engage in surveillance without a warrant have committed a
felony.148 Congress also provided a private cause of action to anyone
subjected to such illegal surveillance.149
The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not reach
individuals outside the country, and the two statutes discussed above
(Title III and FISA) do not limit the government’s ability to conduct
electronic surveillance of communications that take place entirely
outside of the United States.150 The National Security Agency (NSA)
does not need a warrant to monitor communications between two
individuals if both are outside the United States.151
145. FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (The “Church Committee Report”).
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006).
147. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–71 (2006).
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1809.
149. 50 U.S.C. § 1810.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (“Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall be deemed to
affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information
from international or foreign communications . . . .”).
151. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION, at CRS-17 (2006) (noting that FISA does not restrict the government’s ability
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In October 2001, the Bush Administration expanded this
surveillance to reach the content of telephone and e-mail
communications where one party is inside the United States and
another party to the communication is suspected of having a link to
al Qaeda or a related terrorist organization.152 The traditional
understanding is that because one of the parties is inside the United
States, such surveillance requires a warrant, either under Title III or
FISA.153 Nonetheless, the Bush Administration went forward with
this surveillance without warrants, and without informing most
members of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition,

to engage in surveillance of communications outside the United States); JAMES BAMFORD,
BODY OF SECRETS 441 (2002).
152. John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 105 (citing Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, Responses to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, (Mar. 24,
2006)); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY MAJORITY STAFF, REINING IN THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE
W. BUSH 146 (2009) (the program began on or about Oct. 4, 2001). President Bush
indicated that he authorized the program “[i]n the weeks following” September 11, 2001.
President’s Radio Address (White House Radio broadcast Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html. The exact
parameters of this expanded surveillance have not been disclosed, and the surveillance has been
described in varying ways. See, e.g., id. (asserting that one of the parties to the communication
has “known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations”); see also Press Briefing by
Att’y Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat’l
Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html (statement
of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales that “we have to have a reasonable basis to conclude that
one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a
member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda”).
While it is not entirely clear what quantum of evidence constitutes a “reasonable basis,” it
presumably is less than probable cause because if there were probable cause to believe that one
of the parties were a member of al Qaeda, the government would be able to obtain a FISA
warrant to monitor the communication. See Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the
United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 544–45 (2008) (laying out additional formulations
of the criteria used for surveillance); Sims, supra, at 126 (noting that a single phone call
between a suspected terrorist in Pakistan and a person in the United States would not provide
probable cause to believe that the person in the United States is an agent of a foreign power
under FISA).
153. See, e.g., Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of
Law, Duke University, et al., to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. (Jan. 9, 2006),
reprinted in N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Bradley Letter] (response of scholars
of constitutional law and former government officials to “Justice Department’s December 22,
2005 letter to the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees setting forth the administration’s defense of the [domestic spying] program”).
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news reports indicate that AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth turned
over to the NSA the companies’ records of their customers’ phone
calls, enabling the NSA to use these records as part of a massive datamining operation.154 Such disclosure of customer calling records may
violate federal and state privacy law.155
Despite the multiple checks on executive branch illegality
discussed in the previous section, this apparently illegal surveillance
program continued from October 2001 until January 2007, when
the government obtained orders from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) for the targeting of “communications into
or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe
that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or
an associated terrorist organization.”156 How, if at all, did the
accountability mechanisms operate in connection to this program?
While much remains secret, it is possible to sketch out some of the
ways that these accountability mechanisms failed to control this
program. This discussion is divided into two parts: how these
mechanisms operated while the program remained secret, and then
how they operated after the New York Times revealed the program in
December of 2005.
B.

Executive, Congressional, and Judicial Checks while the
Surveillance Program Remained Secret

One of the checks on this surveillance program was its automatic
sunset provision. The President initially authorized the program for
about forty-five days and then renewed that authorization at the end
of each forty-five-day period.157 This kind of automatic sunset
constitutes an internal check on executive power in that it requires
renewed attention to the program each time it expires. This sunset
provision proved particularly important because it was tied to
154. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at A1 (indicating that Qwest refused to turn over these customer records
without a court order).
155. Id. (citing Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 222, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006)).
156. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter
(Jan. 17, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gonzales Letter], available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag011707.pdf; see also ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN,
TERRORISM-RELATED CASES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES—CASE STUDIES
124–25 (2008).
157. See President’s Radio Address, supra note 152.
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another accountability mechanism: a requirement that the Attorney
General certify the legality of the program each time that it was
renewed.
Before the surveillance program could proceed, the Attorney
General had to certify its legality.158 Generally, the Attorney General
defers to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
regarding legal opinions, so it fell to OLC to analyze the legality of
the surveillance program. At this time, Assistant Attorney General
Jay Bybee and his Deputy, John Yoo, were in charge of OLC.159 The
OLC surveillance opinion has not yet been made public in its
entirety, but a 2009 Inspectors General report described and quoted
from the opinion.160 Like the notorious 2002 torture memorandum
described above,161 the surveillance opinion failed to mention
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,162 the leading Supreme Court
decision setting out the limits on the President’s ability to act
contrary to statute, even in the area of national security.163 It asserted
that in enacting FISA, Congress did not purport to limit the
President’s authority to engage in wartime surveillance, but failed to
acknowledge that a provision of FISA explicitly applies during
wartime.164 And the opinion was inaccurate in its factual description
of intelligence activities.165
In 2003, Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as Assistant
Attorney General and began to review the opinions issued by his
predecessor. Goldsmith informed Attorney General John Ashcroft
and Deputy Attorney General James Comey that he needed to
withdraw the earlier opinion because of problems in its legal analysis,
and they concurred. Because of the forty-five day sunset period and
the requirement that the Attorney General sign off each time on the
158. Id. (indicating that the program had to be approved “by our nation’s top legal
officials, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President”).
159. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, A16 (“John Yoo . . . worked on a classified legal opinion on the
N.S.A.’s domestic eavesdropping program.”).
160. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIA, NSA & DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 11–13 (2009) [hereinafter UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT] (referring
to a Nov. 2, 2001, opinion by John Yoo).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 24–30.
162. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
163. UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 13.
164. Id. at 12, 20.
165. Id. at 13, 22.
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legality of the surveillance program, withdrawal of the earlier OLC
opinion would have the effect of halting the program in its thencurrent form.166
The end of the forty-five day period occurred at a time when
Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and had transferred his
responsibilities to Deputy Attorney General Comey, who became the
Acting Attorney General. When the White House learned that the
Justice Department was withdrawing its imprimatur for the
surveillance program, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales went
to Ashcroft’s hospital room, apparently to ask him to overrule
Comey. In dramatic testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 2007, Comey testified about the March 2004
confrontation between Gonzales and the Justice Department lawyers
in Ashcroft’s hospital room.167 Ashcroft refused to re-approve the
program, and the Bush Administration reauthorized the program
without the Attorney General’s certification.168 In response, Comey
and other high level Justice Department officials, including FBI
director Robert Mueller, prepared to resign.169 President Bush’s
Chief-of-Staff Andrew Card expressed concern “that there were to
be a large number of resignations at the Department of Justice.”170
Later, Comey and Mueller each met privately with President Bush,
and after those meetings, the President indicated that the program
would be modified so that it could receive the Justice Department’s
approval.171
While the executive branch is statutorily required to “keep the
[full] congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities,”172 the Bush Administration
informed only the chair and ranking members of those committees,
166. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?—Part IV: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th
Cong. 213–40 (2007) (statement of James Comey, Former Deputy Attorney General, United
States Dep’t of Justice).
167. Id. at 213–15.
168. Id. at 215, 219.
169. Id. at 219. Comey later explained that “I couldn’t stay, if the administration was
going to engage in conduct that the Department of Justice had said had no legal basis.” Id.
170. Id. at 218.
171. Id. at 223–24; see also UNCLASSIFIED IGS’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 27–30.
172. 50 U.S.C. § 413a(1) (2006). This obligation extends only “[t]o the extent
consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally
sensitive matters.” 50 U.S.C. § 413a.
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along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate
about the program.173 The Bush Administration used a claim of
national security secrecy to prevent even this smaller group of
legislators from effectively exercising any oversight regarding the
program by insisting that they not discuss this issue with other
members of the intelligence committees or even their staffs.174 The
powerlessness of these legislators is illustrated by the handwritten
note that Senator Jay Rockefeller sent to Vice President Cheney,
noting that Rockefeller is “neither a technician nor an attorney,” and
decrying his “inability to consult staff or counsel” in order to
evaluate the legality of the program.175
The Justice Department informed the Chief Judge of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) about the program,
and that judge expressed concern about the program’s possible
illegality.176 The judge did not believe that she had the power to rule
on the legality of the program, but did insist that the government
not use any information derived from the program in its warrant
applications with the FISC.177 When a senior Justice Department
lawyer discovered that such information had been used in FISA
warrant applications and informed the FISC Chief Judge, the judge
complained to the Attorney General and insisted “that high-level
Justice officials certify the [warrant application] information was
complete” in order to prevent future lapses.178 The Justice

173. This is the group of legislators (sometimes referred to as “the gang of eight”) to
whom the executive branch must disclose covert actions, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(2) (2006), and
the Bush Administration may have claimed that the surveillance program was a covert action,
thus allowing for narrower disclosure. But covert actions are defined by statute as activities to
secretly “influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad . . . .” 50 U.S.C. §
413b(e). Furthermore, the statute excludes from the definition of covert action any “activities
the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)(1).
174. ALFRED CUMMING, “GANG OF FOUR” CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
NOTIFICATIONS 6 (2009).
175. Letter from Senator Jay Rockefeller to Vice President Cheney (July 17, 2003) (on
file with author), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2005/
intell-051219-rockefeller01.pdf; see also Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in
Intelligence Oversight (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Congress’s Right to
Counsel].
176. Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court’s Judges Were Warned About NSA Spy Data, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A01.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Department temporarily suspended part of the program and
instituted tighter controls.179
Another accountability mechanism, whistleblowing, was also at
play in connection with warrantless surveillance. Thomas Tamm, a
career Justice Department lawyer who worked in the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (which processes FISA warrant
applications and files them with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court), learned of the existence of the warrantless surveillance
program and was concerned about its possible illegality. But he was
stymied when he sought additional information about it from his
supervisors and when he attempted to inform a congressional staff
member about it. In the spring of 2004, he went to a payphone in a
Washington subway station and called New York Times reporter, Eric
Lichtblau, who co-authored the article that broke the story a year
and a half later.180 Tamm’s information about the program was quite
limited, but his “cold call”181 on Lichtblau and their subsequent
conversations prompted Lichtblau and his colleague, James Risen, to
obtain additional information from other sources, eventually
resulting in public disclosure of the program, congressional hearings,
statutory reforms, and civil lawsuits over the program.
C. Congressional, Judicial, Executive and Public Responses to the
Disclosure of the Program
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times published an
article revealing the NSA domestic surveillance program.182 The
Times had held off from publishing the story for more than a year,
apparently at the request of Bush Administration officials who
claimed the publication would harm national security.183 The Times’
decision to go ahead with publication was apparently motivated by
its desire not to be scooped on the story by its own reporter’s
publication of his book covering the issue.184 So competition among

179. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 159, at A1.
180. Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008.
181. Id. After the New York Times disclosure, the Justice Department instituted a
criminal investigation into the leak of this information, eventually focusing on Tamm.
182. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 159.
183. Id. Due to the Administration’s security concerns, Risen and Lichtblau also omitted
“[s]ome information that administration officials argued could be useful to terrorists . . . .” Id.
184. Gabriel Sherman, Risen Gave Times A Non-Disclosure on Wiretap Book, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/38277 (noting that Times
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publications was instrumental in ensuring that this program came to
light.
The following day, President Bush acknowledged the existence
185
of the surveillance program in his weekly radio address, and a few
days later Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence, General Michael Hayden,
convened a press conference to discuss the legal justification for the
program.186 One of the judges on the FISC resigned in protest,187
and the Chief Judge arranged for a secret briefing in which the other
FISC judges would have an opportunity to question Justice
Department officials about the legality of the program.188 Within one
week of the disclosure, the Justice Department released a five-page
letter to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Intelligence
Committees defending the program’s legality,189 and a month later,
the Justice Department issued a forty-two-page white paper with
more detailed legal arguments.190 Legal scholars and NGOs
responded with their own critiques of the white paper.191
The Times article indicated that “[n]early a dozen current and
former officials” discussed the program with the reporters “because

executive editor Bill Keller denied that Risen’s book was a factor in the timing of the NSA
story, but other sources said that Times editors pressed to publish the story prior to the book’s
publication).
185. President’s Radio Address, supra note 152.
186. Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 152. Before becoming Principle
Deputy Director of National Intelligence in April 2005, General Hayden had served since
March 1999 as Director of the NSA, during which period the surveillance program was
developed and implemented. See Biography of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden,
http://www.nsa.gov/about/leadership/bio_hayden.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
187. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Spy Court Judge Quits In Protest; Jurist
Concerned Bush Order Tainted Work of Secret Panel, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01.
188. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judges on Surveillance Court to Be Briefed on Spy
Program, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at A01; Eric Lichtblau, Judges and Justice Dept. Meet
Over Eavesdropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A14.
189. Letter from Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Leadership
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005), in David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security
Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1360–63 (2006).
190. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES
SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE
PRESIDENT (2006), reprinted in Cole & Lederman, supra note 189, at 1374–1414.
191. See, e.g., Bradley Letter, supra note 153; Letter from Scholars and Former
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department
Whitepaper of January 19, 2006 (Feb. 2, 2006), reprinted in Cole & Lederman, supra note
189, at 1415–25.
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of their concerns about the operation’s legality and oversight.”192 In
response, the Justice Department began a criminal investigation to
find out the identity of those who leaked the information.193
Several congressional committees initiated investigations of the
program, requiring administration officials to answer questions about
the program’s legality.194 Nonetheless, Congress eventually passed
legislation that specifically authorizes warrantless surveillance, and
immunizes telecommunications companies that participated,
effectively ratifying the Bush Administration’s surveillance program.
While the Bush Administration claimed that it already had statutory
authority for the program (under the September, 2001
Authorization of Use of Military Force), Congress passed a
temporary revision to FISA in August 2007, that authorized the
government to engage in warrantless surveillance directed at people
outside the United States, even if they are communicating with
persons within the United States.195 This provision lapsed in
February 2008, and later that year Congress passed FISA
Amendments that again authorized warrantless surveillance,
purported to immunize telecommunications companies from private
lawsuits based on their cooperation with warrantless surveillance, and
prohibited state governments from investigating those companies for
such cooperation.196
Private plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the government and
against the telecommunications companies that apparently
cooperated with the government’s surveillance.197 Five of these
lawsuits were against a federal government agency or government

192. Risen & Lichtblau, supra, note 159, at A1.
193. Michael Isikoff, Looking for a Leaker, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 8 (describing
FBI raid on the home of a former Justice Department lawyer who had concerns about the
legality of the surveillance).
194. See, e.g., David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 2 n.4
(Brookings Institution, Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law Working
Paper, Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/
2007/1115_nationalsecurity_kris/1115_nationalsecurity_kris.pdf (identifying congressional
hearings following revelation of the surveillance program).
195. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; see Avery, supra
note 152, at 585–86.
196. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
197. For an excellent in-depth discussion of these lawsuits, see REAGAN, supra note 156,
at 124–59.
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official.198 Dozens of lawsuits were filed against AT&T, Verizon, and
MCI, telecommunications companies that allegedly worked with the
NSA in intercepting these communications.199 In addition, the
Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont state public utility commissions,
two individual commissioners in Missouri, and the New Jersey
Attorney General attempted to investigate these companies, seeking
information about whether the companies violated state privacy laws
in assisting the NSA.200 The federal government sued these state
entities and officials to prevent them from investigating the
program.201
A difficulty facing the private plaintiffs in these suits is proving
that they actually were subjected to surveillance. While the
government has confirmed the existence of the program, it has not
provided specifics of who was targeted for surveillance, so the
plaintiffs have had difficulty proving that they have standing. Some
of the plaintiffs simply allege that they make international calls, and
thus believe that they are subject to surveillance.202 Other plaintiffs,
such as the Center for Constitutional Rights lawyers representing
Guantanamo prisoners who have communicated with those
prisoners’ family and friends abroad, seem to have a stronger claim
that they were likely subject to this surveillance.203
In all of the NSA cases involving private plaintiffs, the
government filed motions to dismiss based on the state secrets

198. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v.
Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007); Complaint, Shubert v Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791 (N.D.
Cal. May 11, 2007) (filed in Brooklyn, but transferred to N.D. Cal.); Complaint, Ctr. for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (filed in Manhattan but
transferred to N.D. Cal.); Guzzi v. Bush, No. 1:06-cv-0136 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2006) (filed in
Atlanta, but transferred to N.D. Cal.); see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 131–32.
199. REAGAN, supra note 156, at 125. A federal judicial center report indicated that “[a]t
least 45 suits” have stemmed from the NSA domestic surveillance program revealed by the
New York Times and the data-mining program revealed by USA Today. Id. at 124–25, 132.
200. See AT&T Mich.’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, In re ACLU of Mich. v. AT&T Mich.,
No. U-15204 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 2, 2007), available at http://efile.
mpsc.cis.state.mi.us (enter case # 15204; then follow “0016” hyperlink).
201. REAGAN, supra note 156, at 140 (identifying the five states as Connecticut, Maine,
Missouri, New Jersey, and Vermont).
202. ACLU, 493 F.3d at 664; Amended Compl., Shubert v. Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791VRW at 2–4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2007), available at http://www.
eff.org/files/filenode/att/ShubertAmendedComplaint.pdf.
203. Complaint, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2007). This suit, like almost all other lawsuits, was transferred to the
Northern District of California; see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 129.
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privilege.204 Until recently, the government invoked the state secrets
privilege to prevent a private party in civil litigation from accessing or
putting into evidence specific items of information that the
government asserted must be kept secret for national security or
foreign policy reasons. In these NSA cases, the government invoked
the state secrets privilege to dismiss the cases in their entirety,
asserting either that the plaintiffs could not prove standing or that
the defense could not prove its case without accessing information
subject to the privilege. While this broad use of the state secrets
privilege is not unprecedented, it is occurring on a larger scale than
in the past. In the first case to reach a federal appellate court, ACLU
v. NSA, the Sixth Circuit ruled for the government on standing
grounds, finding that the plaintiffs could not prove that they had
been subject to the surveillance, and could not get discovery because
of the secrets privilege.205
One group of plaintiffs seems to have strong evidence that it was
subject to surveillance—that connected with the al-Haramain
Foundation, an Oregon charity. In 2004, the Treasury Department
froze the Foundation’s assets because of its alleged ties to al
Qaeda.206 Al-Haramain contested the government’s allegations, and
as part of that proceeding, the government turned over to alHaramain’s lawyer discovery material that documented private phone
conversations between one of the Foundation’s officers in Saudi
Arabia and two of its U.S.-based lawyers.207 The government later
asserted that it had provided this document in error, and retrieved it
from al-Haramain’s lawyers, but did not retrieve the copies in the
hands of al-Haramain itself.208 After the New York Times disclosed
the NSA program in December of 2005, al-Haramain concluded
that this document indicated that it had been subject to the NSA’s
204. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007);
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 650; Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal.
2006); see also REAGAN, supra note 156 at 126 n.1091 (listing state secrets-based motions to
dismiss in additional cases).
205. 493 F.3d at 683, 687–88.
206. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or.
2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
207. Patrick Raddan Keefe, State Secrets: A Government Misstep in a Wiretapping Case,
NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 2008, at 28, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2008/04/28/080428fa_fact_keefe; see also REAGAN, supra note 156, at 130 n.1117. Plaintiffs
described this document as a log of clandestinely monitored telephone calls between the
charity’s director in Saudi Arabia and its lawyers in Washington, D.C. Id.
208. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
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warrantless surveillance, and filed suit in Oregon District Court,
providing the court with a copy of the document in a sealed filing.209
The Oregon District Court denied the government’s motion to
dismiss based on state secrets grounds, and allowed the plaintiffs to
rely on their memories of the sealed document for evidence that they
were subject to surveillance.210 The government appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s decision to allow
the plaintiffs to recreate from memory the sealed document, but
nonetheless remanded the case on the issue of whether FISA
preempts the state secrets privilege.211 While the al-Haramain case
was pending in the Ninth Circuit, all of the NSA-related lawsuits
(except ACLU v. NSA) were transferred to the Northern District of
California as part of the multi-district litigation protocol,212 so the alHaramain case was remanded to Judge Vaughn Walker in San
Francisco. In 2008, Judge Walker ruled that under certain
conditions, FISA partially preempts the state secrets privilege.213
The FISA statute provides a civil cause of action to some who
have been subject to warrantless surveillance,214 and includes
procedures allowing discovery that is not available under the state
secrets privilege.215 Judge Walker ruled that where these procedures
apply, they preempt the state secrets doctrine, but in order to benefit
from that preemption, plaintiffs must first show they have been
subjected to electronic surveillance.216 In making this preliminary
showing, plaintiffs are subject to the state secrets privilege.217 Once
they make this showing, the court will then turn to the issue of
whether the surveillance was legal, and in making that legality
determination, the state secrets privilege does not apply.218 Instead
209. Id. at 1218.
210. Id. at 1227, 1229.
211. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
212. Bob Egelko, Surveillance Lawsuits Transferred to Judge Skeptical of Bush Plan, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 11, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/08/11/BAGRGKGL4S1.DTL.
213. In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
214. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2008) (providing a cause of action to those whose
communications were intentionally subject to warrantless electronic surveillance as long as that
person is not “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”).
215. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2008).
216. In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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the court will use the procedures set forth in FISA.219 Those
procedures allow the court to examine documents in camera and
even to disclose materials to the plaintiffs “under appropriate security
procedures and protective orders” if “such disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.”220
The state secrets privilege prevents al-Haramain from relying on the
accidentally revealed document to show that it had been subject to
surveillance, and so Judge Walker dismissed al-Haramain’s case
without prejudice, allowing it to re-file if it has non-privileged
evidence showing that it was subject to electronic surveillance.221
In early 2006, more than forty members of Congress requested
that the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) open an investigation into whether the department lawyers
acted properly in approving the surveillance program.222 In response,
OPR opened an investigation and planned to interview Justice
Department lawyers who had been involved in the approval process.
The Bush Administration considered all of this information to be
classified, and so in order to pursue the investigation, OPR officials
would need security clearances. Such clearances had been granted to
Civil Division lawyers defending the program in court and to
Criminal Division lawyers investigating the leak to the New York
Times.223 H. Marshall Jarrett, then the head of OPR, requested that
he and six OPR employees be given security clearances so that they
could begin the investigation, but apparently on the advice of then
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, President Bush denied the
clearances, blocking the OPR investigation.224 This was the first time
in its history that OPR shut down an investigation because it was

219. Id.
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
221. In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
222. Memorandum for the Attorney General Through Paul J. McNulty from H. Marshall
Jarrett Re: Status of OPR Investigation (Apr. 21, 2006); Letter from Maurice Hinchey, Henry
Waxman, John Lewis and Lynn Woolsey to George W. Bush (July 18, 2006) (on file with
author), available at http://www.house.gov/hinchey/newsroom/press_2006/071806nsalet
tertobush.html [hereinafter Hinchey Letter].
223. Jason Ryan, White House Blocked Spy Program Probe, ABC NEWS, July 18, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=2208888&page=1.
224. Murray Waas, Aborted DOJ Probe Probably Would Have Targeted Gonzales, NAT’L
J., Mar. 15, 2007, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0315nj1.htm; Ryan, supra note
223.
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denied security clearances.225 Jarrett notified the members of
Congress who had requested the probe, and they responded by
writing the President and requesting that the clearances be
granted.226 More than a year later, when Michael Mukasey replaced
Gonzales as Attorney General, the Bush Administration granted
OPR the clearances, and the investigation began.227
In January 2007, the Bush Administration apparently modified
the surveillance program and brought it under the supervision of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).228 While the Bush
Administration officials initially described the program as broad
enough to target communications where there is “a reasonable basis
to conclude that one party to the communication is . . . a member of
an organization affiliated with al Qaeda,”229 this new iteration of the
program called for targeting “communications into or out of the
United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of
the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated
terrorist organization.”230 This decision constitutes partial
rectification by ceasing the most controversial aspect of the program:
the lack of any judicial supervision. The decision to bring the
program under court supervision may have been caused by pressure
from the cooperating telecommunications companies or by the
prospect of a less friendly 110th Congress controlled by the
Democratic Party.
The Bush Administration’s surveillance program appears to have
violated FISA, and an intentional violation of FISA is a felony.231
Thus, those who authorized the program may have committed a
felony. A few Democratic members of Congress proposed
impeaching President Bush for FISA violations, but there was little
political support for such a move. Calls for impeachment came from
those outside of the mainstream of the Democratic Party such as
Cynthia McKinney, who introduced an impeachment bill at the very
225. Shane Harris & Murray Waas, Justice Department Probe Foiled, NAT’L L.J., May 25,
2006, http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0525nj2.htm.
226. Waas, supra note 224; Hinchey Letter, supra note 222.
227. Terry Frieden, Justice Department to Re-open No-warrant Wiretap Probe, CNN
(Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/domestic.spying/
index.html.
228. Gonzales Letter, supra note 156; REAGAN, supra note 156.
229. Gonzales & Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 152 (emphasis added).
230. Gonzales Letter, supra note 156.
231. 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2008) (prescribing up to five years imprisonment).
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end of the 109th Congress, after she had lost reelection, and Dennis
Kucinich.232 More powerful members of Congress, such as Judiciary
Committee Chair John Conyers, refused to move forward with
impeachment proceedings.233
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLAIMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY
This Article has outlined the multiple mechanisms that can help
ensure that the executive branch complies with the law, and hold the
executive branch accountable when it violates that law. At first
glance, it would appear that this complicated network of multiple
overlapping accountability mechanisms would provide a plethora of
protections and ensure a robust system of accountability. But all of
these accountability mechanisms have one factor in common: their
dependence on information. If the mechanism does not or cannot
obtain information about a particular program, it cannot ensure legal
accountability for that program. Remove the information, and the
entire structure of apparently robust accountability collapses.
By reviewing the complex narrative of the Bush Administration’s
warrantless surveillance program and how accountability mechanisms
responded to it, one can see how this central weakness—vulnerability
to claims of national security secrecy—played out. The Bush
Administration systematically used national security secrecy to
prevent multiple accountability mechanisms from scrutinizing its
warrantless surveillance program. The case study reveals what is
essentially a design flaw in our system of accountability: the executive
branch’s ability to avoid accountability through claims of national
security secrecy. This leads to the next question: How can one cure
this design flaw?
While this Article does not purport to provide a complete answer
to that question, its analysis does suggest that in evaluating both the
need for and efficacy of any particular accountability mechanism, one
must consider that mechanism’s context, and look at how it
functions within the entire architecture of accountability. Where all
of the relevant accountability mechanisms share the same weakness—
232. H.R. Res. 1106, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006); H.R. Res. 1258, 110th Cong.
(2008). Kucinich’s proposal had only eleven cosponsors. See Cosponsors of H.R. 1258,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HE01258:@@@P.
233. See, e.g., Molly K. Hooper, Kucinich May Get Hearing on Impeachment Resolution,
CQ POLITICS, July 14, 2008, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news000002916681.
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the executive branch’s ability to opt out of accountability by claiming
national security secrecy—there may be a particularly urgent need for
reform. Congress needs to consider reforms that would limit the
executive branch’s ability to opt out of accountability. One
possibility would be to require more robust disclosure to Congress. I
have explored elsewhere several options for increasing disclosure to
Congress.234 Here I want to sketch out another possible reform:
limiting the executive branch’s ability to claim the state secrets
privilege to avoid judicial scrutiny of allegedly illegal conduct.
Limiting the state secrets privilege could be accomplished in one
of several ways. The Bush Administration succeeded in using the
state secrets privilege to block dozens of lawsuits arising out of its
controversial programs of domestic surveillance and rendition, and
the Obama Administration is continuing this practice.235 In
persuading courts to dismiss these lawsuits, the executive branch
prevents courts from serving as an accountability mechanism that
could independently examine and evaluate the legality of these
programs. There are already legislative proposals that would limit the
ability of the executive branch to obtain dismissals of lawsuits based
on state secrets grounds, requiring that courts consider in camera
that information that the executive branch claims is privileged.236
Alternatively, one could limit the government’s ability to assert the
state secrets privilege in response to allegations of government
wrongdoing.
Courts recognize and give effect to an evidentiary privilege, such
as the attorney-client privilege, in order to protect and promote a
particular goal, such as facilitating the administration of justice by
ensuring that individuals and entities can get legal advice in
confidence. Similarly, courts have recognized the state secrets

234. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness?:” Disclosing Intelligence to Congress
under Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2010); Congress’s Right to Counsel, supra
note 175.
235. In a lawsuit filed by someone allegedly subjected to extraordinary rendition, the
Obama Administration argued that the case should be dismissed under the state secrets
privilege, and successfully sought rehearing en banc of a Ninth Circuit panel decision that had
reversed dismissal of the case. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2009) (ordering rehearing en banc); Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, Mohamed
v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., No. 08-15693 (9th Cir. 2009), available at http://www.aclunc.
org/cases/active_cases/asset_upload_file741_8488.pdf.
236. See State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong.; State Secrets
Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009).
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privilege to protect information the disclosure of which could harm
the nation’s security. But courts also recognize that privileges have
their limits, and at times the goal or interest that is furthered by a
privilege must give way to a competing goal. So when the Supreme
Court recognized the presidential communications privilege in
United States v. Nixon in order to ensure that presidents could
receive candid advice, the court also acknowledged that this interest
in candor and confidentiality is superseded when the information is
relevant to a criminal trial.237 And while courts have recognized that
governments, like private parties, can assert the attorney-client
privilege to prevent the disclosure of information related to legal
advice, the government’s ability to assert that privilege must give way
in the face of a criminal investigation.238
These wrongdoing-based exceptions show that even worthy
privileges sometimes must give way to the competing public interest
in the disclosure of government wrongdoing, and this analysis may
be just as applicable to the state secrets privilege as it is to the
presidential communications and attorney-client privileges.239
Recognizing a crime- or fraud-based exception to the state secrets
privilege may be necessary to prevent the executive branch from
doing an end run around judicial accountability for violations of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article is a first attempt to outline some of the myriad
mechanisms that hold the executive branch and its officials
accountable for violations of the law. This cataloging of
accountability mechanisms reveals a distributed architecture of
accountability, with mechanisms of varying independence and

237. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974).
238. In re A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002)
(attorney-client privilege inapplicable because government lawyers have duty to act in the
public interest); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (duty of officers of executive
branch to uphold the public trust militates against allowing invocation of attorney-client
privilege to prevent disclosure of criminal offenses within the government); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (attorney-client privilege held
inapplicable to government attorneys, who have a duty to report criminal wrongdoing). But see
In re United States v. Doe, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (attorney-client privilege encourages
government officials to seek out and receive fully informed legal advice).
239. See also Exec. Order No. 12958, as amended by Exec. Order 13292 § 1.7, 68 Fed.
Reg. 15315, 15318 (Mar. 28, 2003) (prohibiting classification for the purpose of hiding
information about illegality).
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efficacy inside and outside the executive branch. In some situations,
one mechanism interferes with the operation of another, as when a
congressional committee’s provision of witness immunity results in
overturning of a criminal conviction of a wrongdoer.240 But in other
situations, these diverse mechanisms actually build on each other, as
when a whistleblower’s revelation to a journalist results in news
story, which then prompts congressional, inspector general, and
sometimes even criminal investigations.241 So any attempt to assess
the efficacy of an individual accountability mechanism must consider
how it builds on and contributes to the work of other accountability
mechanisms.
The Article also analyzed in detail how these accountability
mechanisms operated—or failed to operate—in connection with the
Bush Administration’s warrantless surveillance program. The
executive branch has largely been able to avoid the scrutiny of these
multiple accountability mechanisms by asserting national security
secrecy. This case study reveals a design flaw in our system of
accountability: the executive branch’s ability to avoid accountability
through claims of national security secrecy. The secrecy surrounding
the surveillance program apparently undermined the ability of
existing accountability mechanisms to operate, from congressional
committee oversight, to Inspector General investigations, to civil
lawsuits. There has not yet been a thorough, transparent, and
independent evaluation of that controversial surveillance program.
And that deficiency will remain the case until we see reform limiting
the executive branch’s ability to assert national security secrecy in the
face of credible allegations of wrongdoing.

240. See, e.g., Poindexter v. United States, 951 F.2d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
241. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 15, at 1056–57 (describing the role of FOIA requests
in prompting Inspector General investigations of the military’s mistreatment of prisoners and
the FBI’s abuse of Patriot Act authority); Cynthia M. Nolan, Seymour Hersh’s Impact on the
CIA, 12 INT’L J. INTEL. & COUNTERINTEL. 18 (1999) (the results of the CIA’s internal
investigation were leaked to journalist Seymour Hersh, who wrote a series of stories in the New
York Times, leading to congressional investigations of intelligence abuses).
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APPENDIX: EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS PROSECUTED FOR
MISLEADING CONGRESS (1949 – PRESENT)

Name:

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Bennett E.

After World War II, Meyer was

Convicted of three

1949

Meyers

implicated in possible war

counts of

(conviction

US Army

profiteering and fraud, because

subornation of

affirmed)

Officer –

he had procured parts for the

perjury.

Deputy Chief

Army from his own company.

of

In order to escape responsibility

Procurement

for his corrupt practices, Meyers

of Aircraft

told Bleriot H. Lamarre, the

and Aircraft

president of Aviation Electric

Parts for the

Corporation, which Meyers

Army Air

owned, to lie to Congress about

Official
Position

Force

i

ii

Meyer’s ownership of the
company and two different gifts
from the company to Meyers.

Alger Hiss

Denied to the HUAC that he

Convicted of

1950

Director of

was a communist or had spied

perjury before

(convicted)

the Office of

for the Soviets.

iv

Congress; sentenced

Special

to five years of

Political

prison.

Affairs
(Department
of State)
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Name:

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Richard

Made false statements to Senate

Pleaded guilty to

1975

Kleindienst

committee at hearing on his

withholding

(convicted)

Attorney

confirmation as Attorney

information from

General regarding White House

Congress;

interference in the Justice

cooperated with

Department’s antitrust litigation

prosecution;

against International Telephone

sentence suspended

Official
Position

General

vii

and Telegraph.

viii

to one month
imprisonment, $100
fine, and one month
unsupervised
probation;
investigated and
charged by
Watergate Special
Prosecutor.

ix

John

Made false statements to Senate

Convicted of

1975

Mitchell

Select Committee on

making false

(convicted)

Attorney

Presidential Campaign Activities

statements to

regarding his approval of the

Congress under 18

funding for the Watergate

U.S.C. § 1621 and

break-in, as well as his later

other related crimes;

attempts to cover up the

sentenced to 30–96

General

x

xi

scandal.

months
imprisonment;
investigated and
charged by
Watergate Special
Prosecutor.

xii
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Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

H. R.

Made false statements to Senate

Convicted of three

1975

Haldeman

Select Committee on

counts of false

(convicted)

White House

Presidential Campaign Activities

statements before

Chief of

regarding his and Nixon’s

Congress, and two

contemporaneous knowledge of

related counts;

the Watergate cover-up.

sentenced to 30–96

Official
Position

Staff

xiii

months
imprisonment;
investigated and
charged by
Watergate Special
Prosecutor.

xiv

Richard

Misrepresented the CIA’s covert

Pled guilty to two

1977

Helms

involvement in Chile, which

misdemeanor

(convicted)

CIA

included attempts to influence

counts under

the 1970 presidential election

2 U.S.C. § 192

and assassination and coup

(refusal to testify);

attempts, contrary to the

sentenced to two

policies of the U.S.

years in prison

Government.

(suspended) and

Director

xv

$2,000 fine.

xvi

Rita M.

Testified falsely in a sworn

Convicted of

1985

Lavelle

statement submitted to a

making a false

(conviction

EPA Assistant

congressional subcommittee

statement to

affirmed)

Administrator

and repeated the falsehood

Congress,

under oath that she had recused

obstructing

herself from involvement in an

Congress, and two

investigation of a former

counts of perjury;

xvii

employer.

xviii

sentenced to six
month
imprisonment and
fined $10,000.
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Name:

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Robert C.

Initially denied and then gave

Pled guilty to four

1988

McFarlane

partially false information about

misdemeanor

(convicted);

National

his role as organizer of the

charges that he

1992

Security

Iran/contra scheme; helped

unlawfully withheld

(pardoned)

others, including his

information from

subordinate North, cover up the

Congress about

scandal and lied about doing so;

contra-support

kept certain parts of the affair

activities; sentenced

secret from Congress.

to two years

Official
Position

Advisor

xx

probation, 200
hours community
service, and
$20,000 fine;
charges brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh;
pardoned.

xxi

Oliver L.

Helped to “draft a false

Found guilty of

1989

North

chronology of the Iran arms

aiding and abetting

(convicted);

Deputy

sales and altered and destroyed

obstruction of

1990 (vacated)

Director of

documents in response to

Congress; sentenced

Political-

congressional inquiries into the

to two years

Military

Iran initiative.”

Affairs (NSC
Staff)

xxii

xxiii

probation and
1,200 hours of
community service
and fined $150,000;
vacated on appeal;
charges brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh.

xxiv
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Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

John M.

Shredded and altered paper and

Convicted of one

1990

Poindexter

computer trail regarding

count of conspiring

(convicted);

National

Iran/contra; repeatedly gave

to obstruct official

1991 (vacated)

Security

false version of Iran/contra

inquiries and

transactions that exculpated

proceedings, two

himself and the President to

counts of

Congress.

obstructing

Official
Position

Advisor

xxv

Congress, and two
counts of false
statements to
Congress; sentenced
to six months in
prison; overturned
on appeal; charges
brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh.

xxvi

Alan D.

Cooperated with Independent

Pled guilty to two

1991

Fiers, Jr.

Counsel investigation after it

counts of

(convicted);

Chief of CIA

came to light that he had made

withholding

1991

Central

false statements regarding

information from

(pardoned)

American

operational aspects of

Congress; sentenced

Task

Iran/contra activities.

to 100 hours

Force

xxvii

community service;
charges brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh;
pardoned.
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Name:

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Elliot

“[W]ithheld from Senate

Pled guilty to two

1991

Abrams

Foreign Relations Committee

counts of

(convicted);

Assistant

and the House Permanent

withholding

1992

Secretary of

Select Committee on

information from

(pardoned);

State for

Intelligence (HPSCI) in

Congress under 2

1997

Inter-

October 1986 his knowledge of

U.S.C. § 192;

(censured)

North’s contra-assistance

charges brought by

activities. . . . also admitted that

Independent

he withheld from HPSCI

Counsel Lawrence

information that he had

E. Walsh; pardoned;

solicited $10 million in aid for

publicly censured by

the contras from the Sultan of

DC bar.

Official
Position

American
Affairs

xxix

Brunei.”

xxxii

xxxi

xxx

Duane R.

Testified about role in

Indicted on seven

1991

Clarridge

Iran/contra but denied

counts of perjury

(indicted);

Career CIA

contemporaneous knowledge

and false statements

1992

that weapons were being

to congressional and

(pardoned)

shipped or soliciting support

presidential

from third countries.

investigators;

Officer

xxxiii

charges brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh; pardoned
xxxiv

before trial.
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2010

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Clair E.

“[C]harged with falsely denying

Convicted of one

1992

George

before Congress knowledge of

count of making

CIA Deputy

who was behind the contra-

false statements

Director for

resupply operation and the true

before Congress and

Operations

identity of Max Gomez, a

one count perjury

former CIA operative whose

before Congress;

real name was Felix Rodriguez

charges brought by

and whom Hasenfus had

Independent

publicly identified as part of the

Counsel Lawrence

resupply operation. According

E. Walsh; pardoned

to the charges, George also

before

falsely denied contacts with

sentencing.

Official
Position

xxxv

xxxvii

retired U.S. Air Force Major
General Richard V. Secord, who
was involved in both the Iran
and contra operations.”

xxxvi

Caspar W.

Testified, contrary to evidence,

Indicted on

1992

Weinberger

that he was not a knowing

obstructing a

(indicted,

Secretary of

participant in Iran/contra and

congressional

pardoned)

withheld from Congress

investigation,

relevant personal notes

making false

indicating his participation.

statements to

Defense

xxxviii

Congress, and two
counts of perjury
before Congress;
charges brought by
Independent
Counsel Lawrence
E. Walsh; pardoned
xxxix

before trial.
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Name:

Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

Deborah

Lied to the Senate Committee

Convicted of four

1993

Gore Dean

on Banking, Housing and

counts of false

(convicted);

Department

Urban Affairs about her

statements to

1995 (appeal)

of Housing

nomination to the position of

Congress under

and Urban

Assistant Secretary for

28 U.S.C. § 1001,

Development

Community Planning and

four counts of

Development; “key-player” in

perjury under

the department’s use of funds to

28 U.S.C. § 1621

favor “developers willing to pay

for the same

huge fees to lobbyists with

statements, and four

Official
Position

Official

xl

whom she associated.”

xli

related counts;
§ 1001 convictions
reversed on appeal,
three of § 1621
convictions upheld;
prosecuted by
Independent
Counsel Arlin M.
Adams.

xlii

Michael

In retaliation against his former

Pled guilty to

2000

Horner

employers, Horner fabricated a

conspiracy to

(convicted)

Former U.S.

memo on Customs Service

obstruct a

Customs

letterhead that suggested the

congressional

Service

Customs Service was aiding

investigation

Inspector

xliii

xliv

Mexican drug smugglers; in
order to convince Senator
Diane Feinstein to pursue an
investigation, Horner produced
additional false affidavits from
Customs Service officials which
stated that the original
document was legitimate.
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Predicate Conduct

Result

Date

John T.

Lied in a written response to the

Pled guilty to

2005

Korsmo

Senate Committee on Banking,

making false

Federal

Housing, and Urban Affairs,

statements to

Housing

which was investigating the

Congress; sentenced

Finance

propriety of his being listed as a

to 18 months

Board

“special guest” on a campaign

probation and a

fundraising letter sent to

$5,000 fine.

Official
Position

Chairman

xlv

banking officials he regulated
David H.

Accused of concealing

Convicted for

2006

Safavian

information from a Senate

obstructing a Senate

(convicted);

Chief of Staff

investigator looking into Jack

proceeding and

2008

for the

Abramoff’s activities.

making false

(reversed)

General

statements to a

Services

Senate investigator,

Administra-

along with related

tion

xlvi

xlviii

crimes; all counts
reversed and case
remanded on
xlvii

appeal.

i. Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800, 802–03 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
ii. Id. at 800–02. Convicted of three counts under D.C. CODE § 22-2501 (1940). Id.
iii. United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, 824–25 (2d Cir. 1950).
iv. Hiss, 185 F.2d at 824–25.
v. The statute of limitations had already run on possible espionage charges. Janny
Scott, Alger Hiss, Divisive Icon of the Cold War, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 1,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E0D9143AF935A2575
2C1A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. Hiss was also charged with and convicted of
perjury for his later grand jury testimony to the same. Hiss, 185 F.2d at 824–25.
vi. Scott, supra note v.
vii. D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 147 (D.C. 1975).
viii. Id. at 147–50.
ix. Id. at 149 n.5 (convicted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970)).
x. In re Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100–01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Lawrence Meyer,
John N. Mitchell, Principal in Watergate, Dies at 75, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1988, at A01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/
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stories/mitchobit.htm.
xi. Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01; Meyer, supra note x.
xii. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51-53 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Mitchell was also
convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, false statements to a grand jury
under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Mitchell, 370 N.Y.S.2d at
100.
xiii. JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS 74 (1976); Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 106.
xiv. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 52. The related crimes were one count of conspiracy to
obstruct the investigation into the Watergate cover-up and one count of obstruction of justice.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 535, 836 (Mercer
Cross et al. eds., 1975); see also Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 51 n.3.
xv. Thomas Powers, Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug.
1979, at 33, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/cia/powers.htm.
xvi. Id.; PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION
FOR 1978, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-1978.pdf.
Investigators contemplated bringing other charges, such as perjury, but it was far from certain
that they would be able to force Helms to disclose the classified information needed for such a
conviction. Thus, they offered the two misdemeanor withholding of information counts in
exchange for no jail time or sentencing. Helms accepted the deal, but the judge felt it
necessary to impose a stronger sentence, resulting in the jail time and fine. Powers, supra note
xv.
xvii. United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
xviii. Id. at 1268–70.
xix. Id. One count under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1505,
and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). Id. at 1271 n.4. Ms. Lavelle bears the
dubious distinction of being the only executive branch official actually charged for lying to
Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 between 1955 and 1986. Peter W. Morgan, The
Underfined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
177, 182 (1992). 1955 marked the first time the Court held § 1001 applied to false statements
made to any branch of government. 1986 was the date of the first Iran/contra trials. Elkan
Abramowitz, The Limitation of USC §1001 to the Executive Branch, 214 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995).
xx. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, VOLUME I: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 79–104 (1994),
available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm.
xxi. Id. McFarlane was one of six Iran/contra defendants pardoned by President Bush.
“In recommending the acceptance of this plea of guilty, Independent Counsel gave up the
opportunity to prosecute McFarlane as a member of the conspiracy to defraud the United
States by conducting an unauthorized covert activity, for making false statements to Congress,
and for obstruction of a congressional investigation. The strength of such felony prosecutions
would lie in the admissions of McFarlane and the documentary proof of memoranda from
North to McFarlane. In addition, members of the NSC staff could have testified to North's
direct access to McFarlane, notwithstanding their difference in rank.” Id. However, North and
Poindexter both refused to testify without immunity, and McFarlane denied all other guilt.
Additionally, the independent investigator was worried that McFarlane’s trial and testimony
might disrupt their other prosecutions. McFarlane agreed to cooperate with the investigation
as part of his plea agreement. Id.
xxii. Id. at 105–22, available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm.
xxiii. Id.
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xxiv. Id. North was originally charged on twelve counts: two counts of obstructing
Congress, three counts of false statements to Congress, an additional count of obstruction of
Congress on an aiding and abetting theory, one count of obstructing a presidential inquiry,
one additional count of false statements (to the presidential investigator), one count of
shredding and altering official documents, accepting an illegal gratuity, conversion of traveler’s
checks, and one conspiracy to defraud the United States. The major conspiracy charges had to
be dropped due to information classification issues. In addition to the aiding and abetting
obstruction count, North was also found guilty of shredding and altering official documents
and accepting an illegal gratuity. North was not given prison time because the sentencing
judge felt that probation and community service would be more effective, but this also gave
North little incentive to cooperate with the ongoing independent investigation. On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that North’s trial had been tainted by the immunized
congressional testimony he had given on national television and vacated the convictions. Id.
xxv. Id. at 123–36, available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_03.htm.
xxvi. Id. Poindexter was originally indicted on seven counts. Two conspiracy charges were
dropped due to the confidential information required for conviction. His conviction was
overturned on appeal because his trial had been tainted by earlier immunized testimony and
other grounds. Id.
xxvii. Id. at 263–86, available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_19.htm.
xxviii. Id. Fiers’ plea was part of a testimony agreement. Id.
xxix. In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 6 (D.C. 1997).
xxx. WALSH, supra note xx, at 375–92.
xxxi. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 9, 19.
xxxii. Id. at 6–9.
xxxiii. WALSH, supra note xx, at 247–62.
xxxiv. Id. “On November 26, 1991, a federal Grand Jury indicted Clarridge on seven
counts of perjury and false statements to congressional investigators and to the President's
Special Review Board (the Tower Commission) stemming from his testimony about his role in
the November 1985 arms shipment to Iran.” Id. Counts one through three charged perjury
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under 28 U.S.C. § 1621. Count four
charged perjury before the House Permanent Select Committee. Count five charged false
statements before the president’s Tower Commission. Count six charged perjury before the
Select Iran/contra Committees. Count seven charged false statements in a deposition before
the staff of the Select Iran/contra Committees. Clarridge was pardoned before trial along with
five others. Id.
xxxv. Id. at 233–46.
xxxvi. Id.
xxxvii. Id. George was initially indicted by a grand jury on ten felony counts of perjury,
false statements, and obstruction of Congressional and grand jury investigations. Three
obstruction counts were then dropped after the narrow construal of the statute in the
Poindexter case. Several months later, George was indicted by a grand jury of two
supplemental counts. Nine counts were brought to trial: two counts of false statements to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), two counts of obstructing Congress, two
additional counts of false statements to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI), perjury before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI),
obstructing a grand jury investigation, and perjury before a grand jury. The first trial resulted
in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict regarding any count. The
independent investigator then dropped the two obstruction counts and some of the charged
false statements where more than one statement was charged as false. The jury returned a
guilty verdict as to one of the counts of false statements before the HPSCI and the perjury
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count before the SSCI. George was pardoned, along with five others, a month before
sentencing. Id.
xxxviii. Id. at 405–42.
xxxix. Id. Weinberger was also indicted on one count of perjury to the Office of
Independent Council and the FBI. He was pardoned before his CIPA issues could
be litigated. Id.
xl. United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
xli. Id. at 646.
xlii. Id. “On July 7, 1992, a grand jury returned a thirteen-count indictment against
Dean. The indictment charged Dean with three counts of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, one count of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B), four
counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, and five counts of concealment and false
statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The district court dismissed one of the counts
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On October 26, 1993, a jury found Dean guilty of the
twelve remaining counts.” Id. at 644. Before Dean’s appeal the Supreme Court decided
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 did not
apply to statements made before Congress. Thus, these convictions were overturned. The
single 18 U.S.C. § 1621 count, which was reversed on factual grounds. Id. at 644, 658–66.
Hubbard’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was later superseded by statute in 1996. See
United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp. 2d 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
xliii. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR
2000, at 20 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2000.pdf.
xliv. Id. Horner also pled guilty to giving false information to the FBI. Id.
xlv. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR
2005, at 22-23 (2006) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2005 REPORT], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2005.pdf.
xlvi. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC
INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2006, at 18–19 (2007) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION
2006 REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/docs/arpt-2006.pdf.
xlvii. Id. Safavian was also convicted of obstructing a GSA inquiry, making false
statements, or withholding information from, a GSA inspector general investigator and GSA
ethics officials. Id.; PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2005 REPORT, supra note xlv, at 25–26. The
GSA counts were later reversed because it was not clear that Safavian had a legal duty to
disclose his activities to the GSA. The counts before Congress were also reversed because the
appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in “excluding favorable expert
testimony” regarding the meaning Safavian might have attached to jargon used in his
testimony. United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
xlviii. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 2006 REPORT, supra note xlvi, at 18–19; Safavian,
528 F.3d at 966–69.
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